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I. INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this Article can be stated briefly: The founding generation
clearly understood that federalism would be protected primarily by the
mode of electing the United States Senate. The adoption and ratification of
the Seventeenth Amendment, providing for direct election of the Senate,'
changed all that. The Seventeenth Amendment was ultimately approved
by the United States Congress and ratified by the states to make the
Constitution more democratic. Progressives argued forcefully, persistently,
and successfully that the democratic principle required the Senate to be
elected directly by the people rather than indirectly through their state
legislatures. The consequences of the ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment on federalism, however, went completely unexplored, and the
people, in their desire to make the Constitution more democratic,
inattentively abandoned what the Founders regarded as the crucial
constitutional means for protecting the federal/state balance and the
interests of the states as states.2
1. The text of the Seventeenth Amendment is as follows:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall
have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite
for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate,
the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term
of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
2. The phrase, "the interests of the states as states," refers to their interests as
political rather than merely geographical entities. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, CONMINTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTIoN OF THE UNITED STATES § 454, at 441 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833)
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Following ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, there was a rapid
growth of the power of the national government, with the Congress
enacting measures that adversely affected the states as states-measures
that the Senate would never have approved previously. Initially, i.e.,
during the period from the amendment's ratification in 1913 to NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.3 in 1937, and then again since National
League of Cities v. Usery4 in 1976, the United States Supreme Court's
frequent reaction to this congressional expansion of national power at the
expense of the states was and has been to attempt to fill the gap created by
the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment and to protect federalism.
It has done so by invalidating these congressional measures on the grounds
that they violate the principles of dual federalism, go beyond the Court's
narrow construction of the commerce clause, or "commandeer" state
officials to carry out certain federal mandates. In so doing, the Court has
demonstrated its repeated failure to appreciate that the Seventeenth
Amendment not only eliminated the primary structural support for
federalism but, in so doing, altered the very meaning of federalism itself.
There is irony in all of this: An amendment, intended to promote
democracy, even at the expense of federalism, has been undermined by an
activist Court, intent on protecting federalism even at the expense of the
democratic principle. The irony is heightened when it is recalled that
federalism was originally protected both structurally and democratically-
the Senate, after all, was elected by popularly-elected state legislatures.
Today, federalism is protected neither structurally nor democratically-the
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment means that the fate of
traditional state prerogatives depends entirely on either congressional
sufferance or whether an occasional Court majority can be mustered.
Part 11 of this article explores how the Founders understood that the
mode of electing the Senate (rather than reliance on the Supreme Court)
would be the principal means not only for protecting the interests of the
states as states but also for identifying the line demarcating federal from
state powers. Part IIT provides three examples from the First Congress that
illustrate how well the Founders' reliance on the election of the Senate by
state legislatures to protect the federal/state balance played out in practice.
(citing JAMES MADISON, VIRGINIA REPORT (1800)). See also Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the
Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment 91
NV. U. L. REV. 500,547 (1996-97).
3. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Part IV shows how fully Chief Justice John Marshall appreciated the
Founders' understanding that federalism was to be protected structurally
and not judicially; he could construe Congress's enumerated powers
broadly because he trusted that the Senate would be vigilant and not
approve legislation that adversely affected the states as such. Part V
examines the political forces that led to the adoption and ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment. Part VI reviews the subsequent congressional
expansion of national power at the expense of the states, as well as the
Court's sporadic attempts to fill the gap created by the Seventeenth
Amendment and to protect "the original federal design." Part VII
concludes with a brief consideration of the Supreme Court's recent and
most blatant example of protecting a pre-Seventeenth Amendment
understanding of federalism at the expense of the people's post-
Seventeenth Amendment commitment to democracy: In City of Boerne v.
Flores,' the Supreme Court, in the name of protecting the "federal
balance," struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
passed unanimously by the United States House of Representatives and by
a vote of ninety seven to three in the Senate, and enthusiastically signed
into law by the President.
II. THE FOUNDERS' UNDERSTANDING
A. The Mode of Electing the Senate as a Means of
Protecting the States as States
The Founders understood that federalism would be protected by the
composition and manner of election of the Senate.6 On May 31, 1787, very
early in the Constitutional Convention, the delegates rejected Resolution 5
of the Virginia Plan that proposed that the "second branch of the national
legislature ought to be elected by those of the first,"7 doing so by a vote of
5. 521 U.S. 2157 (1997).
6. By composition, I mean, in the words of Oliver Elsworth, "that in the second
branch each state have an equal vote," resulting thereby in a "general government partly
federal and partly national" 1 THE RECoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
474 (Max Farrand ed., 2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter REcoRDS]. This, of course, is the
description James Madison would apply to the new federal structure created by the
Constitutional Convention in Federalist No. 39. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James
Madison). See also Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History
of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 176-79 (1997), for an excellent discussion of how bicameralism
served to preserve the interests of the states as states. The focus of this Article is not on
the composition of the Senate (or on how equal representation of the states and
bicameralism advance the interests of federalism) but only on the manner by which the
Senate is elected.
7. 1 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 61.
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seven states "no," three states "yes."" Instead on June 7, they accepted by a
vote of ten states "yes," zero states "no," a motion by John Dickinson and
seconded by Roger Sherman providing for the appointment of the Senate
by the state legislatures.9 They were apparently persuaded by Dickinson's
argument that the "sense of the States would be better collected through
their Governments; than immediately from the people at large,"' and by
George Mason's observation that election of the Senate by state
legislatures would provide the states with "some means of defending
themselves [against] encroachments of the [National Government]. In
every other department we have studiously endeavored to provide for its
self-defen[s]e. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with the means
for this purpose?"" Even when the delegates subsequently agreed on June
11 to some form of proportional representation in the Senate,'2 they still
remained firmly committed to the election of the Senate by the state
legislatures.
On June 20, James Wilson, a passionate nationalist, 3 warned his fellow
delegates that "a jealousy would exist between the State Legislatures
[and] the General Legislature."' 4 He observed
that the members of the former would have views [and] feelings very distinct in
this respect from their constituents. A private citizen of a State is indifferent
whether power be exercised by the [General] or State Legislatures, provided it
be exercised most for his happiness. His representative has an interest in its
8. Seel id.
9. See 1 id. at 156.
10. 1 id. at 150. See also Sherman's argument: "[T]he particular States would thus
become interested in supporting the National [Government] and.., a due harmony
between the two Governments would be maintained." Id.
11. 1 id. at 155-56. In "Yates's Notes" for the same day, Mason is reported as
saying: "[T]he second branch of the national legislature should flow from the legislature
of each state, to prevent the encroachments on each other and to harmonize the whole."
1 id. at 157. Unavailing were Edmund Randolph's objection that state legislatures were
marked by "the turbulence and follies of democracy" and Madison's animadversions that
election by state legislatures was not "the best choice" because "[t]he great evils
complained of were that the State Legislatures run into schemes of paper money ...
whenever solicited by the people, [and] sometimes without even the sanction of the
people." lid. at 51, 154.
12. See 1 id. at 202. This decision was, of course, subsequently overturned on July
16 when the Convention accepted what is often called either the "Great Compromise" or
the "Connecticut Compromise" and agreed that the states would be proportionately
represented in the House of Representatives (based on population) and equally
represented in the Senate (with each state having two senators). See 2 id. at 15-16.
13. See Ralph Rossum, James Wilson and the "Pyramid of Government," 6 POL.
Sci. REv. 113-42 (1976).
14. 1 REcoRDs, supra note 6, at 343-44.
being exercised by the body to which he belongs.15
On June 25, he continued his attack on the election of the Senate by state
legislatures, charging that "the election of the [second] branch by the
Legislatures, will introduce [and] cherish local interests [and] local
prejudices."' 6 Wilson's attack, however, utterly failed, not because the
delegates disputed his analysis but because they approved the outcome.'
7
They found persuasive Mason's assertions that the states would need the
"power of self-defen[s]e"'8 and that "the only mode left of giving it to
them, was by allowing them to appoint the [second] branch of the
[National] Legislature"' 9 because they were committed to preserving the
15. 1 id. at 344.
16. 1 id. at 406.
17. See Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, the Seventeenth Amendment, and the
Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189,
193 (1987).
18. 1 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 407. Roger Sherman had already made much the
same argument on June 6: "If it were in view to abolish the State [Governments] the
elections ought to be by the people. If the State [Governments] are to be continued, it is
necessary in order to preserve harmony between the national [and] State [Governments)
that the elections to the former [should] be made by the latter." 1 id. at 133.
19. 1 id, at 407. It must be noted that other "modes" of self-defense were available
as well; the three most important were the requirement that the Senate delegation from a
state vote as a block, the requirement of rotation in office, and explicit provision for the
instruction of senators by state legislatures. See ELAINE K. SwIFr, THE MAKING OF AN
AMERICAN SENATE: RECONSTITuTivE CHANGE IN CONGRESS, 1787-1841, at 39-45 (1996).
As Bybee also points out, the Framers had persuasive reasons for rejecting these other
modes. See Bybee, supra note 2, at 500. Concerning their rejection of block voting,
Bybee notes that:
The reasons for approving per capita voting may have had more to do with the
delegates' practical experience than with a desire to undermine state
representation. The Founders had a great deal of experience with divided
caucuses, and even with caucuses that went unrepresented because of evenly
divided votes. Per capita voting ensured that states would be represented, even
if they were not represented consistently. It also helped assure that divided
delegations would not abstain and frustrate action by the Senate at all.
Id. at 514 (footnote omitted).
Moreover, the Founders may have assumed that per capita voting would represent the
states better, even if a state's senators were divided. Since their elections were
staggered, "they would represent different moods or political sentiments. Senators
elected by shifting majorities in the state legislatures would accurately reflect the shifting
political sentiments of the people." Id.
Concerning recall, the Framers' refusal to embrace this mode "reaffirmed their
commitment to the six-year term. Had the Constitution granted states the recall power,
then each succeeding legislature might select its own delegate to the Senate, perhaps
making the Senate as subject to the winds of political change as the House." Id. at 530.
And concerning instructions, "the right of instruction was mentioned frequently and
was assumed always to exist." Id. at 520. It did not require explicit authorization. As
Rufus King declared in the Massachusetts State Ratifying Convention, "state
legislatures, if they find their [senators] erring, can and will instruct them." 2 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
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states as political entities. Accordingly, on that day, the Convention
reaffirmed its previous decision to elect the Senate by state legislatures by a
vote of nine states "yes," two states "no."2
The service rendered to federalism by the mode of electing the Senate
was also repeatedly acknowledged and proclaimed during the ratification
debates. Examples abound and are listed here in chronological order. In
An Examination of the Constitution of the United States, Tench Coxe,
writing under the pseudonym of "An American Citizen" in Philadelphia's
Independent Gazetteer noted that the members of the Senate will "feel a
considerable checkfrom the constitutional powers of the state legislatures,
whose rights they will not be disposed to infringe, since they are the bodies
to which they owe their existence."2' In the Massachusetts Ratifying
Convention, Fisher Ames described senators elected by their state
legislatures as "ambassadors of the states, ''" and Rufus King declared that
"[tihe senators... will have a powerful check in those men [i.e., those state
legislators] who wish for their seats, who will watch their whole conduct in
1787, at 47 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1888) [hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. Likewise, as Alexander Hamilton declared in the New York State
Ratifying Convention, the people "have it in their power to instruct their representatives;
and the state legislatures, which appoint the senators, may enjoin it also upon them." Id.
at 252. And, as Bybee details, state legislatures not only were assumed to have the
power to instruct their senators, but immediately began to exercise that power as well:
State legislatures instructed their senators, inter alia, to conduct the Senate's business in
public (Virginia); repeal the Sedition Act (Kentucky), and recharter the Bank of the
United States (Pennsylvania and Virginia). They also issued instructions on the
compensation of members of Congress (Massachusetts), the construction of bridges
(Ohio and Pennsylvania), cod fishing and whaling (Massachusetts), pensions
(Massachusetts), futures (Mississippi), free coinage of silver (Mississippi), the admission
of Kansas, California, West Virginia, and New Mexico as states (Virginia, Tennessee,
Vermont), slavery (Vermont), presidential censure (Maine, New Jersey, and Ohio), and
the Eleventh and Twelfth Amendments (Vermont, Massachusetts, and Virginia). See
Bybee, supra note 2, at 524-26.
20. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 408. The importance of having the state
legislatures elect the Senate appears, in fact, to have motivated some delegates ultimately
to favor equal representation of the states in the Senate. See 1 id. at 487-88.
21. An American Citizen [Tench Coxe], An Examination of the Constitution of the
United States, INDEPENDENT GAZErrEER, Sept. 26-29, 1788, reprinted in FRIENDS OF THE
CONsn'ruTON: WRrINGS OF THE "OTHER" FEDERAUSTS 1787-1788, at 466 (Colleen A.
Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998).
22. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 46. Interestingly enough, certain
members of the House of Representatives were still using similar language as late as
1888: The states as "sovereigns [are] ... entitled.., to have a separate branch of
Congress to which they could.., send their ambassadors." H.R. REP. No. 1456, at 4
(1888).
the general government, and will give the alarm in case of misbehavior."'
In Federalist No. 45, Madison declared that, because "[t]he Senate will
be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State Legislatures," it "will
owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State Governments, and
must consequently feel a dependence, which [he insisted] is much more
likely to beget a disposition too obsequious, than too overbearing towards
them."2'4 In Federalist No. 46, he furthef noted that, if the House of
Representatives were to sponsor legislation that encroached on the
authority of the states, "A few representatives of the people, would be
opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives
would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole
body of their common constituents on the side of the latter."z The Senate,
he assured his readers, would be "disinclined to invade the fights of the
individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments." In Federalist
No. 59, Alexander Hamilton likewise emphasized that the appointment of
senators by state legislatures secured "a place in the organization of the
National Government" for the "States, in their political capacities."27 He
continued:
So far as [the mode of electing the Senate]... may expose the Union to the
possibility of injury from the State Legislatures, it is an evil; but it is an evil,
which could not have been avoided without excluding the States, in their
political capacities, wholly from a place in the organization of the National
Government. If this had been done, it would doubtless have been interpreted
into an entire dereliction of the fflederal principle; and would certainly have
deprived the State governents of that absolute safe-guard, which they will
enjoy under this provision.
Finally, in Federalist No. 62, Madison praised "the appointment of
senators by state legislatures" as not only "the most congenial with the
public opinion" but also "giving to the state governments such an agency in
the formation of the federal government, as must secure the authority of the
former." 29
During the New York Ratifying Convention, Hamilton explicitly
connected the mode of electing the Senate with the protection of the
interests of the states as states.
[Wihen you take a view of all the circumstances which have been recited, you
will certainly see that the senators will constantly look up to the state
23. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATEs, supra note 19, at 47.
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 311 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 320 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
26. Id. at 319.
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
28. Id. at 400-01.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 416 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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governments with an eye of dependence and affection. If they are ambitious to
continue in office, they will make every prudent arrangement for this purpose,
and, whatever may be their private sentiments or politics, they will be
convinced that the surest means of obtaining g redlection will be a uniform,
attachment to the interests of their several states.
He also declared: "Sir, the senators will constantly be attended with a
reflection, that their future existence is absolutely in the power of the
states. Will not this form a powerful check?""' Finally, in the North
Carolina Ratifying Convention, James Iredell also noted,
The manner in which our Senate is to be chosen gives us an additional
security.... There is every probability that men elected in this manner will, in
general, do their duty faithfully. It may be expected, therefore, that they will
co6pere in every laudable act, but strenuously resist those of a contrary
nature.
This same argument was also made repeatedly in the early days of the
new republic. For example, in a July 1789 letter to John Adams, Roger
Sherman emphasized that "[t]he senators being eligible by the legislatures
of the several states, and dependent on them for redlection, will be vigilant
in supporting their rights against infringement by the legislative or
executive of the United States."'33 In his 1803 edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries, St. George Tucker declared that if a senator abuses the
confidence of "the individual state which he represents," he "will be sure to
be displaced." 4 James Kent, in his Commentaries on American Law, noted
that "[t]he election of the senate by the state legislatures, is also a
30. 2 ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 306.
31. 2 id. at 317-18.
32. 2 id. at 40. See also James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the
New Constitution, Recommended by the Late Convention, in PAMPHLErS ON THE
CONSTLION OF THE UNITED STATES (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888), in which Iredell
states:
They [Senators] have no permanent interest as a body to detach them from the
general welfare, since six years is the utmost period of their existence, unless
their respective legislatures are sufficiently pleased with their conduct to re-
elect them. This power of re-election is itself a great check upon abuse,
because if they have ambition to continue [as] members of the Senate they can
only gratify this ambition by acting agreeably to the opinion of their
constituents.
Id. at 340.
33. 2 THE FOUNDERs' CONSTITUnON 232 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
34. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARiES: WrH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 23-24 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Birch & Snell
1803).
[VOL. 36: 671, 1999] Constitutional Democracy
recognition of their separate and independent existence, and renders them
absolutely essential to the operation of the national government."35 And
Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
observed that one of the "main grounds" for the mode of appointing the
Senate was that it "would introduce a powerful check upon rash
legislation" and "would increase public confidence by securing the national
government from undue encroachments on the powers of the states."36
B. The Mode of Electing the Senate as a Means of
Partitioning Federal and State Powers
The Founders favored election of the Senate by state legislatures not
simply because it was, as Madison put it in Federalist No. 62, "the most
congenial with the public opinion"' and not simply because it provided, in
Hamilton's words from Federalist No. 59, incentives for senators to remain
vigilant in their protection of the states in their political capacities.38 They
also favored this mode of election because it helped them sidestep what
Madison described in Federalist No. 37 as the "arduous" task of "marking
the proper line of partition, between the authority of the general, and that of
the State Governments.
' 39
An episode at the very outset of the Convention is most telling on this
point. On May 31, the Convention, meeting as a committee of the
whole, had just taken up Resolution 6 of the Virginia Plan that proposed,
inter alia, that "the National Legislature ought... [to be empowered to]
legislate in all cases to which the separate States were incompetent."40
Charles Pinckney and John Rutledge "objected to the vagueness of the
term incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to vote until
they should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by
this definition."'" While Edmund Randolph quickly "disclaimed any
intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature,' ' 2
Madison took a different tack-one he would repeat in The Federalist.
He expressed his "doubts concerning [the] practicability" of "an
enemeration and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by
35. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 225 (New York, 3d ed.
1826).
36. 2 STORY, supra note 2, § 702, at 183.
37. THE FEDERALISTNo. 62, at 416 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 400-01 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 234 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
40. 1 REcoRDs, supra note 6, at 21.
41. 1 id. at 53.
42. 1 id.
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the national Legislature. 43 Despite coming into the Convention with a
"strong bias in favor of an enemeration," he owned that, during the
weeks before a quorum gathered in Philadelphia (during which he and
his fellow Virginia delegates drafted the Virginia Plan, including the
language in Resolution 6), "his doubts had become stronger. '"44  He
declared that he would "shrink from nothing," including, he implied,
abandoning any attempt to enumerate the specific powers of the national
government, "which should be found essential to such a form of
[Government] as would provide for the safety, liberty, and happiness of
the Community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the
necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted
to., 45  Madison would later elaborate on this same "means-ends"
argument in Federalist No. 41, when he declared that "[it is vain to
oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is
worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary
usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary
and multiplied repetitions.""
On May 31, Madison merely foreshadowed the argument he would later
develop more fully in Federalist No. 51, viz., that the power of the new
federal government was to be controlled, not through an exact
43. lid.
44. lid.
45. 1 id. Madison appreciated the difficulty of attempting to put into words a
precise enumeration. As he argued in Federalist No. 37:
Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the
imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through which the
conceptions of men are conveyed to each other, adds a fresh
embarrassment.... Hence, it must happen, that however accurately objects
may be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the
discrimination may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered
inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. And this
unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the complexity
and novelty of the objects defined. When the Almighty himself condescends
to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must
be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by the cloudy medium through which it is
communicated.
THE FEDERALISTNO. 37, at 236-37 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 270 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
See also Alexander Hamilton's similar statements in Federalist No. 31, in which he
describes as "maxims in ethics and politics ... that the means ought to be proportioned
to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object; [and] that there
ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose, which is itself
incapable of limitation." THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961).
enumeration, i.e., through the use of "parchment barriers,"47 but "by so
contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping
each other in their proper places."'4 Nonetheless, his words were obviously
reassuring, for the Convention voted at the conclusion of his speech to
accept that portion of Resolution 6 by a vote of nine states "yes," one state
"divided."49
The Convention apparently shared Madison's doubts about the
"practicality" of partitioning power between the federal government and
the states through an enumeration of the powers of the former. Spending
almost no time debating what specific powers the federal government
should have, it focused instead and almost exclusively on the question of
constitutional structure. Not even when the Committee of Detail created
out of whole cloth what ultimately became Article I, Section 8,50 did the
Convention systematically scrutinize the powers enumerated therein; it did
not even object to the proposed Necessary and Proper Clause.5' The
conclusion is clear: Rather than attempt to draw precise lines between the
powers of the federal and state governments, the Founders preferred to rely
instead on such structural arrangements as the election of the Senate by the
state legislatures to ensure that the vast powers they provided to the
national government would not be abused and that the federal design
would be preserved.
C. The Supreme Court to Play No Role in Preserving the
Original Federal Design
The Founders drafted a Constitution that protected the interests of the
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347-48 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). The mode of electing the Senate was obviously one such contrivance that the
Framers employed to keep the general government in its proper place.
49. See I RECORDS, supra note 6, at 54.
50. There had been no systematic discussion by the members of the Convention of
what powers the new national government was to have when the Committee of Detail
was given the task, on July 26, of taking the various resolutions that the Convention had
approved to date and converting them into a draft constitution. One of the resolutions
was Resolution 6, which then read:
Resolved, That the national legislature ought to possess the legislative rights
vested in Congress by the confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases
for the general interests of the union, and also in those to which the states are
separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.
2 id. at 14, 26, 128.
51. While both Randolph and Elbridge Gerry eventually mentioned the Necessary
and Proper Clause as one of the reasons for their refusal to sign the Constitution, they
never objected to its wording or sought its elimination when the Convention was
reviewing the work of the Committee of Detail. See 2 id. at 563, 632.
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states as states both structurally and democratically. They clearly did not
intend the Supreme Court to protect the original federal design or to
interfere with Congress's decision of where to draw the line between
federal and state powers.2
Just how modest were their designs for the federal judiciary on this
matter (or on any other as well) can be appreciated by simply noting the
placement, brevity, and generality of the judicial article. To begin with,
Article IlI, establishing the federal judiciary, follows Article I, establishing
the legislative branch, and Article I, establishing the executive branch. By
so arranging the articles, the Framers addressed each branch, in the words
of James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional Convention and an
original justice on the Supreme Court, "as its greatness deserves to be
considered."53 Further, Article IH is only about a sixth as long as the
legislative article, and only about a third as long as the executive article.
Moreover, Article I specifies in great detail the qualifications of
representatives and senators (including age and citizenship requirements),
the sizes of the two houses of Congress, the procedures they must follow,
and the powers they are authorized or prohibited to exercise. Article II is
likewise quite detailed in its discussion of the president's qualifications,
mode of appointment, powers, and responsibilities. By contrast, Article III
merely vests the judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court
of unspecified size and in "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. ' 5 Article III outlines no procedures the
courts are obliged to follow, and it imposes no qualifications on judges, not
even the requirement of citizenship.55
More specific evidence that the Founders did not expect the Court to
protect federalism is also available. Thus, the Framers left it up to
Congress itself to put, as it were, flesh on the bare bones of the judicial
article. Under Article Ilf, it would have been possible for Congress to have
limited the entire federal judiciary to a Supreme Court consisting only of a
Chief Justice56 and possessing only original jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction in
52. See Brooks, supra note 17, at 197-98.
53. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 290 (Robert
Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
55. See Ralph A. Rossum, The Courts and the Judicial Power, in THE FRAMING AND
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 222 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds.,
1987).
56. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, cl. 6 (requiring the Chief Justice to preside in the
Senate in cases of the impeachment of the President).
"cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party. 57 If the Framers had seriously
contemplated using the Court as a means of protecting the "residuary
sovereignty" of the states from congressional encroachments, it is highly
unlikely that they would have put "the fox in charge of the henhouse"; put
another way, it is highly unlikely that they would have given Congress
such a free hand in creating and shaping the very body that was thereafter
to hold it in check.
Additionally, the Framers understood that drawing a line between federal
and state powers involved prudential considerations beyond the Court's
legal capacity to pass judgment. They understood that, to the extent that
the Constitution authorized the Court to exercise the power of judicial
review, " it was only in those cases in which the popular branches had
acted, in the words of Federalist No. 78, "contrary to the manifest tenor of
the constitution."5 9 The Court was not to invalidate congressional measures
in close cases. As James Wilson, a vigorous defender of judicial review,'
acknowledged in the Constitutional Convention: "Laws may be unjust,
may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so
unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect."',
57. U.S. CONST. art. l1, §2, cl. 2.
58. Several delegates to the Convention clearly believed that the Court should
have the power of judicial review. [Governor] Morris, for one, observed that the
judiciary should not "be bound to say that a direct violation of the Constitution was law."
2 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 299. Luther Martin, for another, argued against a proposed
Council of Revision on the grounds that "the Constitutionality of laws... will come
before the Judges in their proper official character. In this character they have a negative
on the laws." 2 id. at 76. See also 2 id. at 78 (reporting Gerry's comments). The
problem with these statements, however, is that they imply neither a general power to
expound the Constitution nor an obligation on the part of the other branches to regard a
judicial decision on the constitutionality of their actions as binding. Moreover,
statements were also made by other Convention delegates unequivocally rejecting
judicial review. Thus, for example, John Mercer "disapproved of the Doctrine that the
Judges as expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare a law void. He
thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and then to be uncontro[l]lable." 2
id. at 298. So, too, did Dickinson, who argued that, "as to the power of the Judges to set
aside the law.., no such power ought to exist." 2 id. at 299. See also GEORGE
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSnTTnON OF 1787: A COMMENTARY 47-48 (1989) (concluding, by
proceeding "section by section" through the Constitution, that the Constitution tends toward
legislative supremacy and that judicial review is highly suspect; and noting the "complete
silence in the Constitution about judicial review," wondering if it is "likely... that judicial
review was indeed anticipated, when nothing was said about it, considering the care with
which [for example] executive review was provided for."). See generally Ralph A.
Rossum, The Least Dangerous Branch?, in THE AMERiCAN EXPERIMENT: ESSAYS ON THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LmhERT 241-58 (Peter Augustine Lawler & Robert Martin
Schaefer eds., 1994).
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
60. See Rossum, supra note 13, at 133-34.
61. 2 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 73.
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Rather, as Hamilton makes clear in Federalist No. 78, the Court was to
invalidate measures only in cases in which Congress's disregard for
"certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority" was akin to its
passage of a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.62 Decisions by
Congress regarding where federal power ends and state power begins were
of a different character; they did not implicate "specified exceptions" to
Congress's legislative authority but rather merely involved prudential
judgments, agreed to by a Senate elected by state legislatures, concerning
the outer reaches of delegated congressional powers. As a consequence,
these decisions could never be held unconstitutional by the Court, because
they never could be regarded as clearly contrary to the Constitution's
"manifest tenor." Hamilton's discussion in Federalist No. 33 of the
Necessary and Proper Clause,' regarded by many Anti-Federalists as a
source of unlimited power for Congress, is most instructive in this regard,
as he did not so much as allude to the Supreme Court when he answered
his own question of "who is to judge the necessity and propriety of the
laws to be passed for executing the powers of the Union?"" For Hamilton,
Congress was to judge "in the first instance of the proper exercise of its
powers; and its constituents [and for the Senate, that meant the state
legislatures] in the last."6 If Congress were to use the Necessary and
Proper Clause to "overpass the just bounds of its authority, and make a
tyrannical use of its powers," Hamilton argued that "the people whose
creature it is must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such
measures to redress the injury done to the constitution, as the exigency may
suggest and prudence justify." 66  Again, he made no reference to the
Supreme Court exercising judicial review to negate such congressional
actions.
Finally, the Framers did not intend to allow the Supreme Court to
62. THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 524 (James Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18. "Congress shall have power... [t]o make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof." Id.
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 206 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (emphasis omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id. As Hamilton made clear in both Federalist No. 59 and during the New
York Ratifying Convention, one way the people could redress the injury caused by
congressional infringement on the residuary sovereignty of the States was by electing
state legislators who would hold senators responsible for this infringement. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 59 (Alexander Hamilton); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 306,
317-18.
interfere with the Congress's decision of where to draw the line between
federal and state powers because they wanted the people to have maximum
flexibility to draw the line where they wished. They recognized, as
Madison argued in Federalist No. 46, that the people might "in [the] future
become more partial to the ff]ederal than to the State governments ....
[a]nd in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving
most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due.""1
They were confident that such a "change [could] only result from such
manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration [by the federal
government], as will overcome all [the people's] antecedent
propensities";"8 nevertheless, if such a change of public attitude did come
about, they wanted to accommodate the people's wishes to draw the line
between federal and state power where their direct representatives in the
House and indirect representatives in the Senate wanted them, not where
the Supreme Court might determine.
The likelihood that the Court would constitute much of a check on
federal encroachment of state sovereignty was, of course, never great.
As the Anti-Federalist Brutus observed:
Every body of men invested with office are tenacious of power; they feel
interested, and hence it has become a kind of maxim, to hand down their
offices, with all its rights and privileges, unimpa[i]red to their successors; the
same principle will influence them to extend their power, and increase their
rights; this of itself will operate strongly upon the courts to give such a meaning
to the constitution in all cases where it can possibly be done, as will enlarge the
sphere of their own authority. Every extension of the power of the general
legislature, as well as of the judicial powers, will increase the powers of the
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 317 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
68. Id. But see Federalist No. 39, in which Madison seems to argue to the
contrary. He speaks there of a "tribunal" that is to resolve "controversies relating to the
boundary between the two jurisdictions." THE FEDERALST No. 39, at 256 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). He argues that
the proposed Government cannot be deemed a national one; since its
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the
several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It
is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two
jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established
under the general Government. But this does not change the principle of the
case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the
Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to
secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an
appeal to the sword, and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be
established under the general, rather than under the local Governments; or to
speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is
a position not likely to be combated.
Id. at 256-57. It is not at all clear, however, that the "tribunal" to which Madison was
referring was not the Senate. See GEORGE W. CAREY, IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
104-05 (1995) (arguing that "Madison looked upon the disputes surrounding state-
national relations as primarily political issues to be settled through distinctly political,
not judicial ... processes.")
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courts; and the dignity and importance of the judges, will be in proportion to the
extent and magnitude of the powers they exercise. I add, it is highly probable
the emolument of the judges will be increased, with the increase of the business
they will have to transact and its importance. From these considerations the
judges will be interested to extend the powers of the courts, and to construe the
constitution as much as poible, in such a way as to favor it; and that they
will do it, appears probable.
Nonetheless, as the Framers repeatedly emphasized, if the Court were
ever to interfere with where the political process drew the line between
federal and state powers, the Constitution provided the Congress with
"ample authority to make such exceptions [to the Court's appellate
jurisdiction] and to prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to
obviate or remove these inconveniences."70
69. The Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMLvEM ANn-FEDERALIST 421-22 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981). See also Zywicki, supra note 6, at 228 (discussing the Supreme Court's
"inherent conflict-of-interest in enforcing federalism"); Lino A. Graglia, United States v.
Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719, 770 (1996)
(noting that States are forced to rely on a national court to enforce limitations on national
power).
70. THm FEDERALIST No. 80, at 541 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (emphasis omitted). Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution placed the
Court's appellate jurisdiction under the complete control of the Congress. Therefore, as
Hamilton declared, "If some partial inconveniencies should appear to be connected with
the incorporation of any of [the powers of the judiciary] into the plan, it ought to be
recollected that the national legislature will have ample authority to make such
exceptions and to prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove
these inconveniencies." Id. Also see Hamilton's argument in Federalist No. 81 at 552:
To avoid all inconveniencies, it will be safest to declare generally, that the
supreme court shall possess appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, and
that this jurisdiction shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations as the
national legislature may prescribe. This will enable the government to modify
it in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and security.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 552 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). In the
Virginia Ratifying Convention, John Marshall, later the author of Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), made very much the same argument: "Congress is empowered
to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the Supreme Court.
These exceptions certainly go as far as the legislature may think proper for the interest and
liberty of the people." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 560. In the Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention, the only other convention in which the Exceptions Clause was
specifically discussed, Wilson, chairman of the Federal Convention's Committee of Detail,
likewise noted that if the Court's powers under its appellate jurisdiction "shall be attended
with inconvenience, the Congress can alter them as soon as discovered." 1 PENNSYLVANIA
AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITTION 359 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., Da
Capo Press 1970) (1888). See RALPH RossuM, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF THE
JUDICIARY: THE ARTICLE Ill OPTION (1988); Ralph Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and
the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions
Clause, 24 WM. & MARYL. REv. 385 (1983).
III. THREE EXAMPLES FROM THE FIRST CONGRESS IN WHICH THE
FOUNDERS' UNDERSTANDING IS PLAYED OUT IN PRACTICE
Three examples from the First Congress illustrate well how the
Founders' expectation that the election of the Senate by state legislatures
would protect the federal/state balance played out in practice. They
involve the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the passage of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, and the passage of the act chartering the first Bank of the United
States.
A. The Adoption of the Bill of Rights
On June 8, 1789, James Madison proposed to the House of
Representatives a series of amendments to the Constitution, many of which
eventually became part of what we call the Bill of Rights.7 One of the
very few of his proposed amendments that was ultimately rejected by the
Congress provided that "[n]o state shall violate the equal rights of
conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal
cases."" During the debate on this provision, Representative Thomas
Tudor Tucker, an Anti-Federalist from South Carolina, argued for its
defeat; he observed that, while it was offered as an amendment to the
Constitution, "it goes only to the alteration of the constitutions of particular
states."" He argued that "it will be much better... to leave the state
governments to themselves, and not to interfere with them more than we
already do, and that is thought by many to be rather too much."74 He
therefore moved "to strike out these words."75 Madison defended his
proposal, declaring that he "[c]onceived this to be the most valuable
amendment on the whole list; if there was any reason to restrain the
government of the United States from infringing on these essential rights, it
was equally necessary that they should be secured against the state
governments."'76 By a voice vote, Tucker's motion was rejected, and
Madison's limitation of state governments made its way into the House
Resolution and Articles of Amendment, which were approved on August
71. See generally ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHmENT TO POWER: How JAMES
MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTTruTION (1997).
72. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS 13 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS].
73. Id. at 188.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 188-89. In truth, given his "extended republic" argument in Federalist
No. 10, Madison should have said that it was even more necessary that these rights
should be secured against the States. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
[VOL. 36: 671, 1999] Constitutional Democracy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
24 and thereafter transmitted to the Senate for its consideration. 7
Madison's proposed amendment easily passed the House, but it was
defeated in the Senate. While no Senate debates exist because the Senate
met in secret 78 we do know that the Senate "disagreed" to this particular
provision on September 7*79 In a letter to Patrick Henry, Senator William
Grayson of Virginia suggested that this was because "this disgusted the
Senate. 8 In short, the Senate acted to protect the interests of the states as
states." Madison bitterly complained to Edmund Pendleton that the
Senate's action struck at one of "the most salutary articles. 82 Madison's
disappointment that the Senate seemed interested only in protecting the
interests of the states as political entities was possibly assuaged, however,
by his gratitude for what the Senate also rejected. While it refused to
assent to his proposed amendment that would have altered the constitutions
of the individual states, it also refused to assent to amendments that would
have altered the very structure of the Constitution itself. It rejected, for
example, proposed Anti-Federalist amendments that would have required
that any treaty "ceding, contracting, restraining or suspending the territorial
rights or claims of the United States, or any of them or their, or any of their
rights or claims to fishing in the American Seas, or navigating the
77. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 37-41.
78. See id. at xix.
79. See id. at41 n.19.
80. Id. at 300.
81. See GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1971). The author states:
The Senate's constitutional function, then, is to insist upon protecting state
sovereignty and power, even against demands that that power be sacrificed to
what is declared to be a good cause. This function was performed (with the
good effects and results I have suggested) when the Senate refused to accept
the amendment limiting the states. We cannot claim, the Founders would
concede, that all these particular effects were foreseen; but we did foresee and
plan that such effects would result, and we left it to the working of self-interest
to contribute to the achievement of the desirable results.
Id. at 174.
82. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 296. Fisher Ames wrote that
"[t]he Amendments too have been amended by the Senate, [and] many in our house, Mr.
Madison, in particular, thinks, that they have lost much of their sedative Virtue by the
alteration." Id. at 297 (letter from Fisher Ames to Caleb Strong, Sept. 15, 1789).
Senator Payne Wingate wrote that "[a]s to amendments to the Constitution Madison says
he had rather have none than those agreed to by the Senate." Id. (letter from Paine
Wingate to John Landgon, Sept. 17, 1789). Not all Federalist House members were
disappointed with the Senate's actions. Roger Sherman thought the Senate had "altered
for the Better" the House's proposals. Id. (letter from Roger Sherman to Samuel
Huntington, Sept. 17, 1789).
American Rivers" be approved by "three fourths of the whole number of
the members of both Houses" and that would have required that any
navigation law or law regulating commerce be passed by "two thirds of the
members present in both Houses."83 In short, the Senate acted to preserve
the original federal/state balance, neither agreeing to further restrictions on
the states' "residuary sovereignty" nor embracing measures that would
have weakened the federal government.
B. The Judiciary Act of 1789
The passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 also demonstrates that the
Founders' faith that the mode of electing the Senate would protect the
original federal design was not misplaced. While Article III of the
Constitution vested the judicial power of the United States in "one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish,"" provided that federal judges should hold their
offices during good behavior,85 and outlined the kinds of jurisdiction the
federal courts could entertain,8 it was not "self-executing" and needed
"legislation to bring it to life."" That legislation was the Judiciary Act of
1789, which, interestingly, was crafted almost exclusively by the Senate.8
On April 7, 1789, just one day after the first Senate had a quorum to
organize itself, it created a committee "to bring in a bill for organizing the
Judiciary of the United States." 89  Under the leadership of Oliver
Ellsworth 0 that committee completed a detailed draft of the proposed
83. Id. at 44.
84. U.S. CONST. art. 1H, § 1.
85. See id.
86. See U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2.
87. Paul Bator, Judiciary Act of 1789, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITuriON 1075 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
88. As Wilfred L Ritz writes:
By a decision process that is unknown, the new Senate undertook as its
first order of business the formidable task of constructing an act that would
establish the third branch of government, the judiciary. This division of labor
was apparently agreeable to the House of Representatives, but we do not know
how this agreement was negotiated.
WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING
MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EvIDENCE 13 (Wythe Holt & L. H.
LaRue eds., 1990). Holt suggests the following basis for this division of labor. "In the
important task of building a government, the House first took up the problems of revenue
[because the Constitution requires that money bills originate in the House], while the Senate
undertook to fashion a judiciary." Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.1 1421, 1478
(1989).
89. Henry J. Bourguignon, The Federal Key to the Judiciary Act of 1789, 46 S.C.
L. REv. 647, 667 (1995) (emphasis omitted).
90. Wythe Holt states:
Ellsworth clearly deserves the encomiums he has received as the father of
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legislation by late May, which was readily approved at the committee level
on June 12 and by the full Senate on July 17.9' The House thereupon
overwhelmingly approved the Senate bill with "no material alterations"'
on September 17 and President George Washington signed it into law on
September 24.
What the Senate proposed, and the House readily accepted, was the
following: There would be a Supreme Court-consisting of a Chief Justice
and five Associate Justices-with power, under section 25, to hear appeals
whenever the highest state court having jurisdiction of the case ruled
against the constitutionality of a federal law or treaty, in favor of the
validity of a state act that had been challenged as contrary to the
Constitution or federal law, or against a right or privilege claimed under the
Constitution or federal law.
The Senate also exercised the Congress's constitutional option to
establish a system of inferior federal courts. As Paul Bator notes, it did so
principally because it believed an effective maritime commerce (essential
to the new nation) needed a dependable body of admiralty and maritime
law93 and that the most reliable method to assure its development would be
the Judiciary Act of 1789. Like a good lawyer, he had thoroughly digested the
situation and considered his proposed solution; he knew when to yield but
forcefully presented his complex and apt plan; and he worked ceaselessly to
obtain adoption of it.
Holt, supra note 88, at 1483.
For its first six years, the Senate met in secret, and we have no record of the Senate's
debate on the Judiciary Act. We do have, however, the detailed diary of William
Maclay, a Federalist senator from Pennsylvania. See 9 THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY
AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds.,
1988). Maclay was much less laudatory of Ellsworth than Holt; see his disparaging
remarks of Ellsworth and "this Vile Bill" which Maclay describes as "a child of his, and
he defends it with the Care of a parent." Id. at 91. Maclay's objection was not that the
Bill was either too national or too federal, but that it was too expensive and too likely to
give advantage to the lawyerly class. "[T]his day the Lawyers shewed plainly the
Cloven foot of their Intentions .... Id. at 105.
91. See RnTz, supra note 88, at 17.
92. Holt, supra note 88, at 1516 n.348. Holt reports that "[m]ost observers agreed
with Congressman Benjamin Goodhue that 'no material alterations' had been made in
'the Judicial bill.., as it came from the Senate."' Id. See also Rnz, supra note 88, at 18.
93. See Bator, supra note 87, at 1075. See also John P. Frank, Historical Bases of
the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS. 3, 9 (1948).
The experience of the Confederation convinced virtually every conscientious
patriot of the 1780's that the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be totally,
effectively, and completely in the hands of the national government, and an
extended search has not revealed a criticism from any contemporary source of
the clause of the constitution granting federal admiralty jurisdiction.
Id. In addition, see Bourguignon, supra note 89, at 688.
to entrust it to a new set of federal courts.9' It also did so because at least
one state, Virginia, had adopted legislation prohibiting its judges from
executing federal functions. As Senator Caleb Strong noted:
[T]he State of Virginia by a Law passed since their Adoption of the
Constitution, have prohibited their Officers from holding Offices under the
United States, and their Courts from having Jurisdiction of Causes arising under
the Laws of the Union; by such Laws every State would be able to defeat the
Provisions of Congress if the Judiciary powers of the [General) Government
were directed to be exercised by the State Courts.
Thus, the Senate proposed the creation of a federal district court with one
judge in each state; however, attentive not only to the needs of the
"[General] Govemmenf' but also to the interests of the states; it also
proposed to limit the jurisdiction of these federal district courts to admiralty
cases, petty criminal offenses, and revenue collection, i.e., "to areas where
the state courts had never had jurisdiction or could not appropriately take
jurisdiction,"96 and to allow state courts to have jurisdiction over many
areas of potential federal jurisdiction, including most cases arising under
the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties.97
To avoid the need to create a strong federal district court with broad
jurisdiction in each state, the Senate also proposed the creation of circuit
courts that would hear cases in the three circuits into which the country
would be divided. The circuit courts, consisting of two Supreme Court
justices who literally would ride the circuit and the district judge of the
district where they were sitting, would have some appellate jurisdiction
over the district courts, thus making them "traveling miniature Supreme
Court[s].""8 They would also have original jurisdiction over all federal
crimes, over cases between foreign parties and citizens, or between citizens
of different states. With greater jurisdiction, territorial reach, and prestige
than the district courts, they would bring federal judicial power into all of
Even those opposed to federal district courts in general conceded the need
for district courts with admiralty jurisdiction. The important concession of the
need for federal trial courts to hear at least admiralty cases opened the door for
somewhat broader jurisdiction, since it effectively surrendered the argument
over the expense of federal district courts.
Id. (footnote omitted).
94. They recognized that admiralty jurisdiction had international ramifications and
that uncontrolled state admiralty courts hearing prize disputes had already generated
interstate and international resentment. See Holt, supra note 88, at 1427-30.
95. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800: ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 395-96 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds.,
1992) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF =H SUPREME COURT].
96. Bourguignon, supra note 89, at 679.
97. As Henry Bourguignon has put it, "Federal district court jurisdiction, therefore,
consisted of precisely charted islands in the vast sea of state court jurisdiction." Id. at
682.
98. Id. at 669.
692
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the states. In deference to the states, the Senate also provided in section
34-what has come to be known as the Rules of Decision Act-that "[t]he
laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States in cases where they apply."99 In a further nod to the states,
the Senate included a $500 jurisdictional minimum for the circuit court's
diversity jurisdiction, thus leaving most cases in state courts. Finally, the
Senate limited appeals from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court to legal
issues only (the sole mode of appeal it provided was the writ of error,
which prevented issues of fact resolved by juries from being re-examined),
and it subjected even those issues to a $2000 jurisdictional minimum.
Much of what the Senate proposed in the Judiciary Act of 1789 was
intended to avoid offending state sensibilities. Ellsworth summed it up
this way in a letter to Richard Law once the Senate had completed its
work:
To annex to State Courts jurisdictions which they had not before, as of
admiralty cases, [and] perhaps of offen[s]es against the United States, would be
constituting the Judges of them, [pro tanto], federal Judges, [and] of course they
would continue such during good behavi[or] [and] on fixed sal[a]ries, which in
many cases, would ill[ ] comport with their present tenures of office. Besides if
the State Courts as such could take cognizance of those offen[s]es, it might not
be safe for the general[] government to put the trial [and] punishment of them
entirely out of its own hands. One federal Judge at least, resident in each State,
appears unavoidable. And, without creating any more, or much enhancing the
expen[s]e, there may be circuit courts, which would give system to the
department, uniformity to the proceedings, settle many cases in the States that
would otherwise go to the Supreme Court, [and] provide for the higher grade of
offen[s]es. Without this arrangement there must be many appeals or writs of
error from the supreme courts of the States, which by placing them in a
Subordinate s[]ituation, [and] [s]ubjecting their decis[]ions to frequent reversals,
would probably more hurt their feelings [and] their influence, than to divide the
ground with them at first [and] leave it optional with the parties entitled to
federal Jurisdiction, where the causes are of cqniderable magnitude to take
their remedy in which line of courts they pleased.
Henry Bourguignon has written that "[t]he principles of federalism
permeated the Judiciary Act of 1789..'. He is entirely correct. The Senate
went out of its way to protect the original federal design and the interests of
the states as states. Senator Richard Henry Lee, an Anti-Federalist from
99. 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
100. 4 DocumENTARY HISTORY OF THE SuPREME COURT, supra note 95, at 495
(letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law, Aug. 4, 1789).
101. Bourguignon, supra note 89, at 700.
Virginia, was able to write to Patrick Henry that, "So far as this has gone, I
am satisfied to see a spirit prevailing that promises to send this system out
free from those vexations and abuses that might have been warranted by
the terms of the constitution."' This accommodation, however, infuriated
James Madison. Madison, whose bid to use the Bill of Rights to improve
state constitutions was frustrated by the Senate when it rejected his
proposed amendment mandating the states to protect rights of conscience,
free press, and trial by jury, was again frustrated by the Senate's solicitous
regard for the states. He complained in a letter to Edmund Pendleton that
the Judiciary Act was "defective both in its general structure, and many of
its particular regulations."'' 3
C. The First Bank Act
The third example, the passage of the act chartering the first Bank of
the United States, also shows the founding generation's appreciation for
the way in which the mode of electing the Senate protected state
interests. On December 14, 1790, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton transmitted a report to the House of Representatives proposing
the creation of a National Bank, describing it as "an institution of
primary importance to the prosperous administration of the [new
nation's] finances."'0 4 Hamilton's report was a response to a House
order that he detail "such further provision as may, in his opinion, be
necessary for establishing the public credit."'0 5  Hamilton's report
focused on what he called "[c]onsiderations of public advantage."' In
it, he reviewed the "principal advantages of a bank,"' 7 addressed its
102. 2 THE LETrERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE, 1911-1914, at 487 (Leonard W. Levy
ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1914) (letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, May
28, 1789). Compare these sentiments with those expressed by the Federal Farmer
(generally supposed to have been written by Lee), especially Letters from the Federal
Farmer No. 15, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 69, at 315-
23. Arthur Lee, brother of Richard Henry Lee, concurred: "[I]t is difficult to say how...
[the Judiciary Act could] have been framed less exceptionable." Holt, supra note 88, at
1517 (quoting letter from Arthur Lee to Tench Coxe, Aug. 4, 1789). However, see also
the notes of Pierce Butler's speech, delivered on the floor of the Senate on July 17, 1789,
in which he argued that "the Ultimate tendency" of the Judiciary Act "manifestly will be
to destroy, to Cut up at the Root the State Judiciaries." THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY
AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES, supra note 90, at 455.
103. Holt, supra note 88, at 1516-17 (quoting letter from James Madison to
Edmund Pendleton, Sept. 14, 1789).
104. LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 15 (M. St. Clair Clarke &
D.A. Hall eds., 1832) [hereinafter BANK OF THE UNITED STATES].
105. Id.
106. Id. at 29.
107. Id. at 16.
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"disadvantages, real or supposed,"'0' discussed the relation of the
proposed bank to the three banks then in existence in the United States
(the Bank of North America, originally established by Congress under
the Articles of Confederation but subsequently chartered by
Pennsylvania, the Bank of New York, and the Bank of Massachusetts),' 9
outlined "the principles upon which a national bank ought to be
organized,""0 and spelled out twenty-four specific provisions for its
operation."' Hamilton's report was devoid of any constitutional
arguments addressing Congress's power under the Constitution to
charter such a bank. It may well be, however, that he thought it obvious
that Congress had this power. This was the view of Congressman John
Laurance, a Federalist from New York, who would later argue on the
floor of the House: "Under the late confederation .... the Bank of North
America[] was instituted. He presumed that it would not be
controverted, that the present government is vested with powers equal to
those of the late confederation.""
2
On December 23, the House delivered a copy of Hamilton's report to
the Senate, which took the lead and quickly passed a bill incorporating
the Bank of the United States on January 20, 1791, by a vote of sixteen
to six."3 While the Senate deliberations were not open to the public, its
journals reveal that most of the Senate debate centered on the length of
the term of the Bank's incorporation, an issue that Hamilton had not
addressed. Motions to limit its term of incorporation to seven or ten
years were rejected; so, too, was a motion to extend it all the way to
1815. Ultimately, the Senate agreed to a twenty-year term, with the
Bank's charter set to expire on March 4, 181 1.
On January 21, the bill was referred to the House, which began its
consideration of the Bank on February ."' On February 8, the House
likewise approved the measure but only after a heated debate, led by
James Madison, over its constitutionality."16 Madison denied that the
108. Id. at 18.
109. See id. at 25-28.
110. Id. at28.
111. See id. at 28-33.
112. Id. at 38.
113. See id. at 36.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 36-37.
116. See id. at 39-45, 82-85. Much speculation has arisen as to Madison's
opposition to the Bank of the United States. His opposition, after all, seems inconsistent
with his views on the Bill of Rights and the Judiciary Act. See CARNY, supra note 68, at
Necessary and Proper Clause could be read so broadly as to justify
incorporating the Bank.
The doctrine of implication is always a tender one. The danger of it has
been felt in other Governments. The delicacy was felt in the adoption of our
own; the danger may also be felt, if we do not keep close to our chartered
authorities.
Mark the reasoning on which the validity of the bill depends. To borrow
money is made the end, and the accumulation of capital implied as the means.
The accumulation of capital is, then, the end, and a bank implied as the means.
The bafl is then the end, and a charter of incorporation.., implied as the
means.
Supporters of the Bank Act responded to Madison in several different
ways. Several members quoted the Preamble of the Constitution and
defended the Bank as a means for achieving the "common defense and
general welfare.""' Fisher Ames argued that the Bank was constitutional
even under Madison's narrow reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. "The most orderly governments in Europe have banks. They
are considered as indispensably necessary; these examples are not to be
supposed to have been unnoticed."...9
Congressman William Loughton Smith of South Carolina made an
especially interesting argument.
It would be a deplorable thing.., if this Government should enact a law
subversive of the constitution, or that so enlightened a body as the Senate of the
United States should, by so great a majority as were in favor of this bill, pass a
law so hostile to the liberties of this countg, as the opposition to this measure
have suggested the bank system to be ....
Smith's argument showed keen insight. The Senate, whose mode of
election ensured the protection of the interests of the states as states, did
not regard the passage of the Bank Act as a threat to the residuary
sovereignty of the states; rather, it considered the Bank as necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the enumerated powers of Article I,
Section 8 and for achieving the great objects spelled out in the Preamble.
Elbridge Gerry would build on Smith's argument.
The interpretation of the constitution, like the prerogative of a sovereign, may
be abused, but from hence the disuse of either cannot be inferred. In the
exercise of prerogative, the minister is responsible for his advice to his
sovereign, and the members of either House are responsible to their constituents
for their conduct in construing the constitution. We act at our peril: if our
conduct is directed to the attainment of the great objects of Government, it will
91-94 (providing an excellent discussion of what might have "caused Madison's change
of heart").
117. BANK OF THE UNrrED STATES, supra note 104, at 42.
118. See id. at 49, 58, 65, 76 (reporting speeches of Ames, Stone, and Gerry).
119. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 63.
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be approved ....121
The state legislatures were the constituents of the Senate, and it was
for them to judge whether the Senate was serving the great objects of
government or jeopardizing the original federal design.
Madison's arguments that the Congress lacked the power to charter the
Bank of the United States and that it was invading the reserved powers of
the states were unavailing in the House, which approved the Bank Act by a
vote of thirty-nine to twenty.'22 They did, however, sufficiently concern
President Washington that, when the measure was sent to him for approval,
he referred it to Attorney General Edmund Randolph"z and Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson for their opinions.I In brief statements, both
agreed that the bank bill was contrary to the Constitution"z and urged
Washington to veto it.26
Randolph argued that the implied powers argument of the Bank's
supporters "would beget a doctrine so indefinite as to grasp every power '27
and would "stretch the arm of Congress into the whole circle of State
legislation.""' Concerning the Necessary and Proper Clause, after initially
insisting that it "does not enlarge the powers of Congress, but rather
restricts them," he subsequently abandoned that view and concluded that
"as the friends of the bill ought not to claim any advantage from this
clause, so ought not the enemies to it, to quote the clause as having a
restrictive effect. Both ought to consider it among the surplusage which as
often proceeds from inattention as caution."'29 Jefferson argued that the
Bank Act went beyond the boundaries "specifically drawn around the
powers of Congress" and took "possession of a boundless field of power,
no longer susceptible of any definition."'3° He insisted that the Necessary
and Proper Clause limited the Congress to "those means, without which
the grant of power would be nugatory.''
121. Id. at 78.
122. See id. at 85.
123. See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank
Bill: The Attorney General's First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 112
(1994).
124. See id. at 112.
125. See BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 104, at 89, 91.
126. See id. at 94.
127. Id. at 86.
128. Id. at 89.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 91.
131. Id. at93.
These opinions thereupon prompted Washington to ask Hamilton for
his sentiments on the validity and propriety of the Act. Hamilton's
opinion was lengthy and detailed.' In it, he advanced a powerful "means-
ends" argument much like Madison himself had made during the
Constitutional Convention (when he "doubt[ed]" the "practicability" of
enumerating the powers of the federal government)'33 and that Hamilton
himself had made in Federalist No. 31.2 Hamilton declared that
every power vested in a government, is, in its nature, sovereign, and includes,
by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite, and fairly
applicable, to the attainment of the ends of such power, and which are not
precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the consftution, or not
immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of political society.
Washington was ultimately persuaded by Hamilton's argument, and,
rather than deliver the veto message he had asked Madison to prepare,
he signed the act incorporating the Bank on February 25, 1791.3
IV. MARSHALL'S APPRECIATION OF THE FOUNDERS' UNDERSTANDING
The Founders' understanding that federalism would be protected
structurally, i.e., by the manner of electing the Senate, was borne out in the
First Congress. Their understanding also appears to have been fully
appreciated by Chief Justice John Marshall when he read expansively the
Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland37 and the
Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden."8 He did not fear that his broad
construction of Congress's enumerated powers would destroy federalism,
because he understood that the Senate would not approve of legislation that
adversely affected the states as such. The Court was to be appropriately
restrained in its review of congressional measures because the Senate could
be trusted to be vigilant.
132. Hamilton's opinion was over 15,000 words in length, compared to Randolph's
two opinions totaling approximately 4500 words and Jefferson's opinion totaling
approximately 2500 words.
133. 1 RECORDs, supra note 6, at 53.
134. In Federalist No. 31, Hamilton described as "maxims in ethics and politics ...
that the means ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be
commensurate with its object; [and] that there ought to be no limitation of a power
destined to effect a purpose, which is itself incapable of limitation." THE FEDERALIST
No. 31, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
135. BANK OF THE UNrrED STATES, supra note 104, at 95 (emphasis omitted).
136. See 1 Stat. 191 (1791).
137. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
138. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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A. McCulloch v. Maryland
In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court recognized Congress's
power to charter the second Bank of the United States and invalidated a
Maryland tax on that bank.'39 The first Bank, chartered for a period of
twenty years, expired in 1811 when legislation to reauthorize it failed by
one vote in each house.'o The disorganization of the country's finances
during the War of 1812, however, prompted Madison, now serving as
President, to take a very different view from what he had in the past and
to propose a second Bank of the United States,' which, after several
false starts, was agreed to by Congress and signed into law by
Madison on April 10, 1816.
When Maryland thereupon adopted in 1818 a "practically annihilatory
tax"' on the Maryland branch of the Bank, John Marshall was given the
opportunity to address the question of the reach of Congress's powers
under Article I, Section 8. His answer can be summarized as follows:
What Congress can do under its enumerated powers-i.e., what is
delegated to it as opposed to what is reserved to the states-is a question
for Congress alone to decide."4
Marshall began by observing that Congress's power to incorporate a
139. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
140. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE
REVOLTnON TO THE CIvIL WAR 222 (1957).
141. In his Seventh Annual Message to Congress on December 5, 1815, Madison
declared:
It is, however, essential to every modification of the finances that the benefits
of a[] uniform national currency should be restored to the community. The
absence of the precious metals will, it is believed, be a temporary evil, but until
they can again be rendered the general medium of exchange it devolves on the
wisdom of Congress to provide a substitute which shall equally engage the
confidence and accommodate the wants of the citizens throughout the Union.
If the operation of the State banks can not produce this result, the probable
operation of a national bank will merit consideration ....
2 A COMPI LATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 550-
51 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). Regarding his earlier arguments that the Bank was
unconstitutional, Madison declared that they were "precluded ... by repeated
recognitions, under varied circumstances, of the validity of such an institution, in acts of
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, accompanied by
indications in different modes of a concurrence of the general will of the nation."
HAMMOND, supra note 140, at 233-34.
142. The Senate approved the second Bank bill by a vote of 22 to 12, the House by
a vote of 90 to 61. See HAMMOND, supra note 140, at 240.
143. Id. at 263. Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Ohio had all
imposed confiscatory taxes on the Bank, and others were considering doing so. See id.
144. See Graglia, supra note 69, at 725.
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bank could
scarcely be considered as an open question, entirely unprejudiced by the former
proceedings of the nation respecting it. The principle now contested was
introduced at a very early period of our history, has been recognized by many
successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the juicgial department, in
cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation.
He acknowledged that "a bold and daring usurpation" would surely
have to be resisted even "after an acquiescence still longer and more
complete than this.""' Nonetheless, he continued, federalism questions
posed no danger of such a usurpation as they "are not concerned" with
"the great principles of liberty" but only with how "the respective
powers of those who are equally the representatives of the people, are to
be adjusted."'47 Consequently, on these matters, the Court would have to
defer to congressional practice. As Marshall had noted in his earlier
discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause in United States v.
Fisher,'48 if Congress's "election" of where to draw the line between its
powers and those of the states "interfere[s] with the right of the state
sovereignties," it "is the necessary consequence of the supremacy of the
laws of the United States on all subjects to which the legislative power
of congress extends," and any objection to this outcome should not be
directed to the Court but should be understood to be "an objection to the
constitution itself.'
'149
Marshall reminded the parties that "[t]he power now contested was
exercised by the first Congress elected under the present constitution."'50
And he stressed that the question of the first Bank's constitutionality was
fully debated at the time:
The bill for incorporating the bank of the United States did not steal upon an
unsuspecting legislature, and pass unobserved. Its principle was completely
understood, and was opposed with equal zeal and ability. After being resisted,
first in the fair and open field of debate, and afterwards in the executive cabinet,
145. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,401 (1819).
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
149. Id. at 397. Fisher was the Supreme Court's first consideration of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. See 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREAnTSE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 341 (3d ed. 1999). Marshall does
not cite Fisher in his McCulloch opinion, but, as David P. Currie notes,
It was typical of Marshall not to cite even his own opinions although they
squarely supported him .... So far as the report reveals, counsel [in
McCulloch] had not invoked Fisher, and maybe nobody remembered it. That
decision had not raised much dust in 1805; that was a long time before
McCulloch, and the indexing of cases was not what it is today.
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HuNDRED
YEARS, 1789-1888, at 163 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
150. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at401.
[VOL. 36: 671, 1999] Constitutional Democracy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
with as much persevering talent as any measure has ever experienced, and being
supported by arguments which convinqd minds as pure and as intelligent as
this country can boast, it became a law.
Marshall then turned to the Bank's more recent history. While "[tlhe
original act was permitted to expire... a short experience of the
embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the
government, convinced those who were most prejudiced against the
measure of its necessity, and induced the passage of the present law."'52
All of this prompted him to remark that "[i]t would require no ordinary
share of intrepidity to assert that a measure adopted under these
circumstances was a bold and plain usurpation, to which the constitution
gave no countenance. '53
Marshall made it clear that, when the "respective powers"'' of the
federal and state governments were involved, the Court would defer to the
Congress.' 55  The House and the Senate were, as he pointed out, as
"equally" representative of the people,'56 and therefore of the states, as the
state legislatures themselves. Thus, so long as Congress did not engage in
"a bold and daring usurpation" by trenching on "the great principles of
liberty"'57 as they were practiced in the states, something highly unlikely
given the composition and mode of electing the Senate, 58 the Court would
not "tread on legislative ground."' 59 Marshall repeated the same "means-
ends" argument that Madison made in the Convention and that Hamilton
offered in his defense of the Bank bill when he proclaimed that
the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature
that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to
151. Id. at 402.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803).
155. For Marshall, "adjust[ing]" the "respective powers" of the federal and state
governments was different from preserving the separation of powers within the federal
government itself. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401. In Marbury v. Madison,
Marshall insisted that "[iut is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial
department, to say what the law is," and, on that basis, struck down, on behalf of a
unanimous Court, an offending provision of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
156. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
157. Id.
158. See THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 417 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
159. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
be carried into execution, which will enable that body to pVfform the high duties
assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people.
Here again, he was merely repeating his earlier words from Fisher:
"Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to
use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power
granted by the constitution."' 6 In Fisher, Marshall had rejected a narrow
construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause: "In construing this
clause it would be incorrect and would produce endless difficulties, if
the opinion should be maintained that no law was authori[z]ed which
was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power."'62
In McCulloch, he was able to construe the Clause affirmatively and
broadly, to declare that it authorized the Congress to adopt all measures
that are "convenient or useful" for carrying into execution its
enumerated powers,'63 and to proclaim that for the Court to "inquire into
the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes
the judicial department.""' Marshall concluded with what is probably the
most famous rule of constitutional interpretation ever uttered by a Supreme
Court Justice: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."'65
For Marshall, "Congress alone can make the election'6 of where "the
respective powers"' 67 of the federal government end and the states begin.63
160. Id. at 421.
161. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805).
162. Id.
163. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413.




168. Marshall, of course, did insist that,
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are
prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of
executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not
entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal,
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act
was not the law of the land.
Id. at 423. But, this merely repeats the theme he introduced early in his opinion when he
distinguished between measures that threaten "the great principles of liberty" and
measures that merely demarcate the line between federal and state power. Id. at 401.
Moreover, he prefaced that statement with these words: "But were its [the Bank's]
necessity less apparent, none can deny its being an appropriate measure .... Id. at 423.
For Marshall, even if the Court were appropriately to review questions of line drawing,
i.e., if it were constitutionally authorized to second-guess Congress's decision of where
its enumerated powers end, this was not even a close case. Marshall can rattle his
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The Court, he insisted, "disclaims all pretensions to such a power', 169 and
appropriately so, for the mode of selecting senators would ensure that
Congress's "election" of where to draw the line would be protective of the
interests of both.
B. Gibbons v. Ogden
In Gibbons v. Ogden,7' the Supreme Court held that Congress's power
to regulate commerce extended to the regulation of navigation and that the
laws of New York granting to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the
exclusive right of navigating the waters of that state collided with and
therefore had to yield to a 1793 federal law regulating the coastal trade,
which, being made in pursuance of the Constitution's delegation to the
Congress of the power to regulate commerce among the several states, was
supreme.171 Marshall's argument for the Court in Gibbons paralleled his
argument in McCulloch. He began by employing a similar "means-ends"
argument and by asserting that, with respect to the extent of any given
power (in this case, the Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce),
"it is a well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, especially,
when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great
influence in the construction."'72 He saw
no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not
convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself,
or which can inure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an investment of
power f% the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that
purpose.
The "object" of the Commerce Clause, Marshall continued, was to
empower Congress to regulate not merely buying and selling but all
"commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches;"'7 4 clearly, therefore, the Commerce Clause extended to
navigation. As Marshall declared,
The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between
judicial-review sword secure in the knowledge that the mode of electing the Senate
spares him of the need to draw it to protect federalism.
169. Id. at 423.
170. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
171. Seeid. at3.
172. Id. at 188-89.
173. Id. at 189.
174. Id. at 189-90.
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nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be
silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the
other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the coqlyct of individuals, in the
actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter.
Marshall then proceeded to observe, again in a manner reminiscent of his
McCulloch opinion, that the Congress's exercise of the power to regulate
navigation under the Commerce Clause was longstanding. It was
"exercised from the commencement of the government" and "with the
consent of all. ' 76  And finally, Marshall argued that it was up to the
Congress, not the Court, to draw the line between what the federal
government could regulate and what was reserved for state control. The
Commerce Clause is an "investment of power for the general advantage"
placed "in the hands of agents selected for that purpose, '  i.e., the
members of the House and Senate, and Marshall had full confidence in
these "agents."
The wisdom and the discretion of congress, their identity with the people, and
the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in
many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints
on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the
restraints on )Which the people must often rely solely, in all representative
governments.
As Marshall well appreciated, the "constituents" of the Senate were the
state legislatures, and, as Gerry had observed in the debate over the Bank
Act in the First Congress, the senators would therefore feel their
"influence" at re-election time and would disregard their interests only at
their peril.
17
V. ALTERING THE ORGINAL FEDERAL DESIGN: THE ADOPTION AND
RATIFICATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Founders' original understanding of how federalism would be
protected succeeded admirably for the first century.' 0 The measures that
175. Id. at 190.
176. Id. Marshall pointed to the passage of federal laws "prescribing what shall
constitute American vessels or requiring that they shall be navigated by American
seamen." Id.
177. Id. at 189.
178. Id. at 197.
179. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
180. See Zywicki, supra note 6. Zywicki states:
Statistical and anecdotal evidence suggests that the Senate played an active
role in preserving the sovereignty and independent sphere of action of state
governments. Rather than delegating lawmaking authority to Washington,
state legislators insisted on keeping authority close to home .... As a result,
the long term size of the federal government remained fairly stable and
relatively small in scale during the pre-Seventeenth Amendment era. Although
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the Congress passed were obviously understood, even by the Senate, as
consistent with the original federal design and as serving those interests
that prompted the adoption and ratification of the Constitution in the first
place.'8' With Dred Scott' as the principal exception, they were so
understood by the Supreme Court as well.'83 Over time, however, the
public became increasingly dissatisfied with the indirect election of the
Senate and unappreciative of the protection it rendered to federalism. The
first joint resolution aimed at direct election of the Senate was introduced
in the House of Representatives on February 14, 1826.'" From then until
May 13, 1912, when the Congress submitted to the states for their
ratification a proposed constitutional amendment providing for direct
election of senators, 187 joint resolutions of a similar nature were
introduced before Congress.'9 The House approved six of these proposals
the federal government grew substantially in size in response to particular
crises, most notably wars, it returned to its long-term stable pattern following
the abatement of the crisis. The "rachet effect" of federal intervention
persisting after the dissipation of the crisis which purportedly spawned it, was
absent from American history until 1913.
Id. at 174 (footnotes omitted).
181. Included among these measures is the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment;
while that amendment nationalized citizenship and provided the Congress with enormous
power under Section 5, so long as the Senate that had to concur in the actual employment
of that enormous power was elected by state legislatures, federalism and the interests of
the states as states remained secure. Also included are the passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, and the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906. Passage of the Interstate Commerce Act was prompted by Wabash,
St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 551 (1886), in which the Supreme
Court made railroads an interstate issue by declaring that states could not regulate
interstate railroad traffic within their own borders, even in the absence of congressional
legislation. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act were
appropriate measures for dealing with an emerging national economy, and all three
regulatory measures were, as the political scientist Theodore J. Lowi points out,
"traditional," "rule-bound," and "proscriptive." THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PuBLIC Aumrorrry 134 (1969).
182. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (declaring
unconstitutional Congress's attempt to regulate the spread of slavery in the Missouri
Compromise of 1820).
183. Supreme Court invalidations of congressional measures on federalism grounds
during this time period were few in number (seven cases, including Dred Scott) and, with
the exception of Dred Scott, were of little consequence. See infra note 253.
184. The joint resolution was introduced by H. R. Storrs, a Federalist from New
York. See Wallace Worthy Hall, The History and Effect of the Seventeenth Amendment
10-11 (1936) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Berkeley)) (on
file with University of California (Berkeley) Dept. of Political Science).
185. See id. at 443-56 (providing a table of the date, author, title, disposition, and
citation for each of these 188 joint resolutions).
before the Senate reluctantly gave its consent."'
By proposing what became the Seventeenth Amendment, the Congress
was yielding to well-nigh unanimous public opinion in favor of the direct
election of the Senate.'" Several factors were at work undermining support
for the status quo. One was legislative deadlock over the election of
senators brought about when one party controlled the state assembly or
house and another the state senate. '88 Numerous examples of such
deadlock could be found: In 1885, the Oregon legislature failed, after sixty-
eight ballots, to elect a senator and eventually did so only in a special
session. Two years later, West Virginia failed to elect anyone. In 1893,
the legislatures in Montana, Washington, and Wyoming deadlocked and
failed to elect senators, whereupon the governors of these states filled the
vacancies by appointment, only to have the Senate deny them their seats on
the grounds that only the state legislatures could elect senators. Deadlock
was perhaps most evident and embarrassing in Delaware; it was
represented by only one senator in three Congresses and by none at all
from 1901 to 1908.89 From 1885 to 1912, there were seventy-one such
186. The House approved these proposals by a two-thirds voice vote on January 16,
1893; by a vote of 141 to 50 on July 21, 1894; by a vote of 185 to 11 on January 12,
1898; by a vote of 242 to 15 on April 13, 1900; by a two-thirds voice vote on January 21,
1902; and by a vote of 296 to 16 on April 13, 1911. See DAvi E. KYVIG, ExPLIcIT AND
AUTHENTIc AcTs: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 209 (1996); Hall,
supra note 184, at 163-64.
187. But see Zywicki, supra note 6, at 201-19 (presenting a public choice analysis of
the Seventeenth Amendment and arguing that it was not public opinion but the wish of"special interests" to "increas[e] the importance of [their] ... money and organization in
Senate elections" that led to the adoption and ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment
(emphasis omitted)).
188. Zywicki persuasively argues that
the real problem was not divided party government but a law which had been
passed in 1866 which had required that Senators be elected by a majority of the
state legislatures. Majority votes were difficult to come by in states with
evenly-balanced party competition and third-parties who could prevent either
of the dominant parties from receiving a majority in the state legislatures.
Amending this 1866 statute to permit election by plurality or requiring run-offs
would have solved the deadlock problem without the need for a constitutional
amendment.
Id. at 199-200 (footnotes omitted). What makes this 1866 statute particularly interesting
is that it was passed to allow the Senate Republicans to expel John Stockton, a Democrat
elected by the New Jersey legislature with only 40 of the 81 votes cast, and therefore to
increase the likelihood that they would be able to overturn President Andrew Johnson's
veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. As Bybee notes, "Stockton's expulsion
'[u]nderscor[ed] the intensity of Republican feeling' and helped prevent the sustaining of
the veto." Bybee, supra note 2, at 537 n.239.
189. See KyvIG, supra note 186, at 209. See also 1 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRAcTIcE 92 (1938); Hall, supra note
184, at 287-301. As Zywicki points out, however, despite these problems, Delaware
affirmatively voted to reject the Seventeenth Amendment. See Zywicki, supra note 6, at
199.
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legislative deadlocks, resulting in seventeen senate seats going unfilled for
an entire legislative session or more.9' These protracted deadlocks not
only deprived the affected states of representation in the Senate but also
consumed a great deal of state legislative time.9' that was therefore not
spent on other important state matters.'9
A second factor undermining support for the election of senators by state
legislatures was the scandal brought on by charges of bribery and
corruption. Between 1866 and 1900, the Senate was called on nine times
to investigate alleged bribery in Senate election cases.193 In the 58th
Congress alone, a full ten percent of the Senate's entire membership was
put on trial or subjected to legislative investigation. 94 Two of the most
infamous cases involved the elections of Montana Senator William A.
Clark in 1899 and Illinois Senator William Lorimer a decade later. Clark
confessed to a "personal disbursement" of over $140,000 to the legislators
of Montana and resigned his seat during floor deliberations of a unanimous
Senate committee report recommending his expulsion.9 Lorimer, a dark-
horse candidate acceptable to both parties, was elected by a bipartisan
coalition, thereby breaking a protracted stalemate; however, a year later,
the Chicago Tribune broke the story of how four state legislators were
bribed to change their vote on his behalf, and in 1912, half-way through the
completion of his term, Lorimer was expelled by the Senate.'96
190. See Hall, supra note 184, at 506-11 (providing a table of the date, state, ballots
cast, senator elected (if ever), and citations to each of these 71 legislative deadlocks over
the election of senators).
191. But see CHRISTOPHER H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL
INTENT AND THE SEvENTEENTH AMENDMENT 89 (1995) (arguing that "[alithough press
accounts often gave the impression that these deadlocks brought all legislative business to a
standstill, the truth was that most legislatures took one vote at the beginning of each day and
continued with their normal affairs").
192. See Zywicki, supra note 6, at 198-99. Zywicki downplays this problem, noting
that
only thirteen states deadlocked more than once and only six states twice or
more. In most states, it took only one or two deadlocks for the legislature to
learn not to repeat the process again. In addition, many of the states with
repeated deadlocks were newly-admitted western states with inexperienced
legislatures, weak party discipline, and successful third-party movements. As
western legislators gained experience with Senate elections, deadlocks became
less frequent.
Id. at 198-99 (footnotes omitted).
193. See 1 HAYNES, supra note 189, at 91.
194. See GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS 165 (1906).
195. Interestingly, however, Montana returned Senator Clark the following year.
See id. at 56.
196. See HOEBEKE, supra note 191, at 91-97; see also Hall, supra note 184, at 252-74.
A third factor, closely related to the second, was the growing strength of
the populist movement and its deep-seated suspicion of wealth and
influence. It presented the Senate as "an unrepresentative, unresponsive
'millionaires club,' high in partisanship but low in integrity."' While
populism quickly waned, progressivism waxed in its place, providing still a
fourth factor: progressivism's belief in "the redemptive powers of direct
democracy,"' 98 i.e., its conviction that the solution to all the problems of
democracy was more democracy."
Election of senators by state legislatures came to be associated in the
public mind with stalemate, corruption, plutocracy, and reaction; by
contrast, direct election of senators was associated with reform, integrity,
democracy, and progress. The public demanded change and repeatedly
carried this message to the Congress itself through direct petitions.
Beginning with a petition from the citizens of Kendall and LaSalle,
Illinois, dated January 18, 1886, and continuing through the day the
Seventeenth Amendment received congressional approval, the Congress
received a total of 238 petitions from labor groups, farmers'
associations, and other citizens' groups calling for direct election of the
Senate.2
The politicians also demanded change. Beginning with the Nebraska
Republican Party in 1872 and continuing until the ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment, a total of 239 party platforms called for direct
election of the Senate, including 220 state party platforms and 19
national party platforms.Y
Even the states themselves demanded change. Beginning with a
memorial from the California State Legislature on February 18, 1874,
and continuing through congressional adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1912, the Congress received a total of 175 memorials
from state legislatures urging adoption of direct election of the Senate.02
State legislatures did more, however, than merely demand change by
sending memorials to the Congress; they took other steps as well to
bring it about. Thus, by 1912, thirty-three states had introduced the use
of direct primaries,"3 and twelve states had adopted some form of what
197. KYVIG, supra note 186, at 209; see HOEBEKE, supra note 191, at 101.
198. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 185.
199. See HOEBEKE, supra note 191, at 18-24.
200. See Hall, supra note 184, at 457-81 (providing a table of the date and
sponsoring group for each of these 238 petitions).
201. See id. at 490-505 (providing a table of the particulars of these 239 party
platforms).
202. See id. at 512-27 (providing a table of the dates of and state legislatures
responsible for these 175 state memorials).
203. See id. at 319. State direct primary laws fell into three classes:
(1) Laws giving to the party state committee the discretion of holding a
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was known as the "Oregon system." 2 4
South Carolina was the first state to introduce the direct primary in
1888.205 The direct primary democratized the election of senators in the
same way that the election of the president had been democratized. As
Alan Grimes explains,
In the same fashion in which state members of the Electoral College cast their
votes for the presidential candidate who had received the greatest popular vote
in the state, so the state legislatures were asked to elect that candidate20or
senator who had received the greatest popular vote in a preferential primary.
The direct primary, however, shared the same problem as the
democratized Electoral College: the faithless elector. State legislators
were not legally bound to abide by the results of the primary and could
primary either under state control or party auspices for the purpose of selecting
the party senatorial nominee were passed in Georgia (1890-91), Florida (1901),
South Carolina (1902), Alabama (1903), Idaho (1903), Virginia (1904),
Arkansas (1905), and Kentucky (1907).
(2) Laws making it mandatory upon the parties to select their candidates
for senator by means of the direct primary were passed in Mississippi (1902),
Oregon (1904), Wisconsin (1904), Louisiana (1906), Iowa (1907), Michigan
(1907), Missouri (1907), Nebraska (1907), North Dakota (1907), South Dakota
(1907), Texas (1907), Washington (1907), Oklahoma (1907-08), Kansas
(1908), Maryland (1908), New Jersey (1908), Nevada (1909), Tennessee
(1909), Colorado (1910), Maine (1911), Minnesota (1911), and Montana
(1913).
(3) Laws providing that senatorial candidates might submit their names in
primary elections but that the vote cast was to be considered by the legislature
as an advisory vote only were passed in Illinois (1906), Ohio (1908), and
California (1909).
Id. at 319-20. These laws prompted Zywicki to argue that "by the time the Seventeenth
Amendment was adopted, direct election of Senators was already a fait accomplis."
Zywicki, supra note 6, at 190.
204. Hall, supra note 184, at 335. The twelve states were Oregon (1904), Idaho
(1909), Nebraska (1909), Nevada (1909), Colorado (1910), California (1911), Kansas
(1911), Minnesota (1911), New Jersey (1911), Ohio (1911), Montana (1912), and
Arizona (1912). See id. at 334-35.
205. See Sara Brandes Crook, The Consequences of the Seventeenth Amendment:
The Twentieth Century Senate 27 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Nebraska (Lincoln)) (on file with University of Nebraska Dept. of Political Science).
The direct primary was, of course, preceded by the public canvass, in which senatorial
candidates would barnstorm the state seeking support for their parties in the state
legislature in hopes of securing a governing majority there, which would determine who
would be sent to Washington as senator. William Riker contends that the first public
canvass occurred in Mississippi in 1834. See William Riker, The Senate and American
Federalism, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 452, 463 (1955). It did not become widespread,
however, until the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858. See Brooks, supra note 17, at 207.
206. ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
76 (1978).
ignore the wishes of the voters. In an attempt to solve this problem, the
State of Oregon passed by initiative in 1904 the "Oregon system."
Under this system, a general election runoff was held between the
primary nominees for the Senate of the major parties, and candidates for
the state legislature were "permitted" to include in their platform one of
two statements regarding their views on the election of senators.
"Statement No. 1" pledged the candidate to abide by the results of the
general election and, regardless of party affiliation, to vote "for that
candidate for United States Senator in Congress who has received the
highest number of the people's vote for that position at the general
election."20 7 "Statement No. 2" declared that the candidate would treat
the results of the general election as nothing more than a
recommendation and would vote according to his personal discretion.2 '
Eleven other states quickly imitated the "Oregon system," with many
going even further. Nebraska, for example, required that, after each
candidate's name on the primary ballot for the state legislature, the
following words would appear: "Promises to vote for people's choice for
United States Senator" or "Will not promise to vote for people's choice for
United States Senator."'
The states took another decisive step as well to bring about direct
election of the Senate; they exercised their power under Section V of the
Constitution and called for a convention to consider amending the
Constitution to provide for direct election of the Senate. By 1910, twenty-
seven of the thirty-one state legislatures then required to call a convention
had formally petitioned the Congress. Arizona and New Mexico were
about to become states and were expected to join the ranks of those
supporting such an amendment, while Alabama and Wyoming had
submitted resolutions supporting the idea of a convention but without
formally calling for one.2'0  The fear of a "runaway" constitutional
207. Hall, supra note 184, at 330.
208. See GRIMES, supra note 206, at 76; ALLEN H. EATON, THE OREGON SYSTEM:
THE STORY OF DmEcT LEGISLATION IN OREGON 92-98 (1912). "By 1909, when Oregon's
Republican legislature elected a Democratic senator who had won the popular contest,
the system's effectiveness was demonstrated." KYVIG, supra note 186, at 210.
209. As a consequence, when George Norris, the Republican Party primary
nominee for the Senate, defeated his Democratic Party opponent in the 1912 general
election, the Democratically-controlled Nebraska Legislature duly elected Norris and
sent him to the Senate. See Crook, supra note 205, at 30.
210. See HOEBEKE, supra note 191, at 149-50. David Kyvig explains the origins of
this strategy.
In 1900 a committee of the Pennsylvania legislature suggested a coordinated
effort of states to demand a convention. The Senate would not act, the
committee believed, until two-thirds of the states forced it to do so.
Pennsylvania sent every other state a copy of its convention petition to
encourage them likewise to submit one.
KYVIG, supra note 186, at 210.
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convention, along with the fact that most senators represented states whose
legislatures were on record favoring direct election of the Senate, proved
decisive.21' Thus, on May 13, 1912, the 62nd Congress finally approved
the Seventeenth Amendment by a vote in the Senate of 64 to 24 (with 3 not
voting) and by a vote in the House of 238 to 39 (with 110 not voting).22 It
was ratified by the requisite three-fourths of the state legislatures in less
than eleven months and was declared to be a part of the Constitution in a
proclamation of the Secretary of State dated May 31, 1913.23
What is particularly noteworthy of the lengthy debate over the adoption
and ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment is the absence of any
serious or systematic consideration of its potential impact on federalism.
214
The consequences of the Seventeenth Amendment on federalism went
unexplored. The popular press, the party platforms, the state memorials,
the House and Senate debates, and the state legislative debates during
ratification focused almost exclusively on expanding democracy,
eliminating political corruption, defeating elitism, and freeing the states
211. See Bybee, supra note 2, at 537-38 ("The wake-up call to the Senate was
apparently the defeat in 1910 of ten Republican senators who had opposed the proposed
amendment.").
212. See GRIMES, supra note 206, at 82. The large number of House members "not
voting" reflected Southern disappointment with the decision to drop what was described
as a race rider from the Amendment. That rider provided that "[t]he times, places, and
manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the
legislature thereof' and was intended by its sponsors to nullify the effects of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 77. Grimes describes the politics of this provision in detail.
See id. at 76-82; see also KYVIG, supra note 186, at 212-13.
213. The dates of ratification were: Massachusetts, May 22, 1912; Arizona, June 3,
1912; Minnesota, June 10, 1912; New York, January 15, 1913; Kansas, January 17,
1913; Oregon, January 23, 1913; North Carolina, January 25, 1913; California, January
28, 1913; Michigan, January 28, 1913; Iowa, January 30, 1913; Montana, January 30,
1913; Idaho, January 31, 1913; West Virginia, February 4, 1913; Colorado, February 5,
1913; Nevada, February 6, 1913; Texas, February 7, 1913; Washington, February 7,
1913; Wyoming, February 8, 1913; Arkansas, February 11, 1913; Maine, February 11,
1913; Illinois, February 13, 1913; North Dakota, February 14, 1913; Wisconsin,
February 18, 1913; Indiana, February 19, 1913; New Hampshire, February 19, 1913;
Vermont, February 19, 1913; South Dakota, February 19, 1913; Oklahoma, February 24,
1913; Ohio, February 25, 1913; Missouri, March 7, 1913; New Mexico, March 13, 1913;
Nebraska, March 14, 1913; New Jersey, March 17, 1913; Tennessee, April 1, 1913;
Pennsylvania, April 2, 1913; and Connecticut, April 8, 1913. Ratification was thus
completed on April 8, 1913. The Amendment was subsequently ratified by Louisiana on
June 11, 1914. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Virginia did not vote to ratify. Delaware and Utah
affirmatively voted against its ratification. See Hall, supra note 184, at 617-19.
214. See Brooks, supra note 17, at 206 ("It may seem incredible that what seemed
to the Framers the obvious and crucial anti-centralizing function of indirect election
should pass almost unnoticed in 1911."). See also Bybee, supra note 2, at 505, 538.
from what they had come to regard as an onerous and difficult
responsibility. Almost no one (not even among the opposition) paused to
weigh the consequences of the Amendment on federalism.215
Only three exceptions are apparent in the voluminous record. One was
Representative Franklin Bartlett, a Democrat from New York, who argued
eloquently on the floor of the House on July 20, 1894, that the interests of
the states as states should be preserved by keeping the senators as
representatives of state governments. Bartlett quoted statements made by
215. The same can be said of those who have studied the history and consequences
of the Seventeenth Amendment. Hall, for example, reports the beneficial effects of the
amendment to be (1) the elimination of legislative deadlocks, (2) the separation of state
and national issues in state political campaigns, and (3) the prevention of certain
scandalous legislative elections. See Hall, supra note 184, at 438. He finds the baneful
effects to be (1) increased costs to secure election to the Senate, (2) an accentuation of
the time-consuming, non-legislative functions of senators, and (3) the encouragement of
demagogy. See id. at 440. He also reports little or no change in such matters as the age,
length of service, or previous occupations of senators and notes that popularly-elected
senators had less previous governmental service (although more were former governors)
than their predecessors prior to 1913. See id. at 438-39. He offers, however, no
commentary whatsoever on the impact of the Seventeenth Amendment on federalism.
Crook reports on the demographic, behavioral, and institutional consequences of the
Seventeenth Amendment but likewise without ever mentioning federalism. See
generally Crook, supra note 205. She finds, demographically, that popularly-elected
senators have fewer family ties to Congress, are more likely to be born in the states they
represent, are more likely to have an Ivy League education, and are likely to have had a
higher level of prior governmental service. See id. at 184-85. She finds, behaviorally,
that House members are now more likely to seek a senate seat and to do so with less
tenure in the House. See id. at 187. And she finds, institutionally, that the states are now
more likely to have split senate delegations, and that the Senate now more closely
matches the partisan composition of the House. See id. at 190-91. In neither her
conclusions nor her section on "Future Research" does she even hint at the consequences
of the Amendment on the federal/state balance. See id. at 195-97; see also Sara Brandes
Crook & John R. Hibbing, A Not-So-Distant Mirror: The 17th Amendment and
Congressional Change, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 845 (1997).
Hoebeke also ignores the federalism question in The Road to Mass Democracy. While
the subtitle to his book is "Original Intent and the Seventeenth Amendment," he sees the
original intent of those who provided for the election of the Senate by state legislatures
to be to check the excesses of popular government, not to protect the federal/state
balance and the interest of the states as states. See HOEBEKE, supra note 191, at 27.
Kyvig likewise presents the consequences of the Seventeenth Amendment in wholly
democratic terms: It "altered political decisionmaking both substantially and
symbolically as it replaced the Founders' system of vesting power in an elite insulated
from the masses with one that rendered the Senate more directly responsive to the
public." KYVIG, supra note 186, at 214. See id. at 478.
The only genuine exceptions to this characterization of the scholarship on the
Seventeenth Amendment are Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A
Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1347 (1996);
Brooks, supra note 17; Bybee, supra note 2; Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the
Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 629 (1991);
Virginia M. Mclnerney, Federalism and the Seventeenth Amendment, 7 J. CHRisTIAN
Juius. 153 (1988); Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice
Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REv. 1007 (1994); Zywicki, supra
note 6.
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George Mason and John Dickinson during the Constitutional Convention
and by James Madison in Federalist No. 62 in support of his conclusion:
It follows, therefore, that the framers of the Constitution, were they present in
this House [today], would inevitably regard this resolution as a most direct blow
at the doctrine of State's rights and at the integrity of the State sovereignties; for
if you once deprive a State as a collective organism 9f6all share in the General
Government, you annihilate its federative importance.
The other two exceptions were in the Senate: George F. Hoar, a
Republican from Massachusetts, and Elihu Root, a Republican from New
York. On the Senate floor in April of 1893, Senator Hoar defended
indirect election of the Senate, declaring "[S]tate legislatures are the bodies
of men most interested of all others to preserve State jurisdiction .... It is
well that the members of one branch of the Legislature should look to them
for their re-election, and it is a great security for the rights of the States. 217
After quoting approvingly from Story's Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States that election of the Senate by the state legislatures
"would increase public confidence by securing the National Government
from any encroachments on the powers of the States, 2 18 Hoar continued:
The State legislatures will be made up of men whose duty will be the
216. 53 CONG. REc. 7774 (1894). To the extent that there was any response by the
proponents of direct election to Bartlett's concern, it was found in the majority report of
the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections, which declared:
The share of representation to be accorded each State in the Senate is one
thing, and the mode or manner of selecting that representation, whatever it may
be, is quite another and different thing. The one-the former-relates to the
question that Senators are more particularly the representatives of the States in
their political capacity; while the other relates only to what perhaps may by
some be considered the more unimportant matter, as to how and by whom the
States shall choose this representation, whether by their legislatures or by a
direct vote of the people.
It is therefore made apparent to your committee that the question as to
whether the Senate of the United States should be regarded as... the
representative of the people of the States, was determined in so far as that
question ever has been determined, not by the mode or manner in which
Senators should be chosen;... but rather in the consideration and
determination of the question as to the fixed ratio of representation that each
State should have in respect to its sister States in the Senate of the United
States.
S. REP. No. 54-530, at 2, 4 (1896) (emphasis omitted).
217. S. Doc. No. 59-232, at 21 (1906). Senator Hoar's speech was printed as a
Senate Document in 1906. See id.
218. Id. at 20 (quoting 2 STORY, supra note 2, § 702, at 183). See supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
administration of the State authority of their several State interests and the
framing of laws for the government of the State which they represent. The
popular conventions, gathered for the political purpose of nominating Senators,
may be quite otherwise composed or guided. Here, in the State legislature, is to
be foujpl the great security against the encroachment upon the rights of the
States.
In 1911, Senator Root argued against direct election of the Senate on
these very same grounds: "Let me tell the gentlemen who are solicitous for
the preservation of the sovereignty of their States that there is but one way
in which they can preserve that sovereignty, and that is by repudiating
absolutely and forever the fundamental doctrine on which this resolution
proceeds."2 ' He also argued that depriving state legislatures of the
opportunity to elect senators would rob them "of power, of dignity, of
consequence" and would lead them to grow "less and less competent, less
and less worthy of trust, and less and less efficient in the performance of
their duties. You can never develop competent and trusted bodies of public
servants by expressing distrust of them, by taking power away from
them."22' He worried aloud that, if the state legislatures were perceived as
untrustworthy in the exercise of their power to elect senators, the result
would be an expansion of the federal government. "If the State
government is abandoned, if we recognize the fact that we can not have
honest legislatures, sir, the tide that now sets toward the Federal
Government will swell in volume and in power.' "tm With state legislatures
removed from the process, he predicted that "It]he time will come when
the Government of the United States will be driven to the exercise of more
arbitrary and unconsidered power, will be driven to greater concentration,
will be driven to extend its functions into the internal affairs of the
States."'m He warned that "we shall go through the cycle of concentration
of power at the center while the States dwindle into insignificance."'
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S ATrEMPT TO PROTECT THE
ORIGINAL FEDERAL DESIGN
By ratifying the Seventeenth Amendment, the people in their pursuit
of more democracy inattentively abandoned what the founders regarded
as the primary constitutional means for the protection of the federal/state
balance and the interests of the states as states. = Senator Root
219. S. Doc. No. 59-232, at 21.





225. Bybee speculated that the people "preferred democracy to representation and
were willing to shoulder the loss to constitutional federalism." Bybee, supra note 2, at
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accurately predicted what followed: a rapid expansion by Congress of the
reach and power of the national government at the expense of the states.
Since 1913, there has been a profound increase in the number and
intrusiveness of congressional measures invading the "residuary
sovereignty" of the states.?
Examples abound: The Federal Child Labor Act of 19160 7 and the
Federal Child Labor Tax Act of 1919 were early examples; they trenched
on the police power of the states to regulate the health, safety, and morals
of the community by banning from interstate commerce or by taxing goods
that, while themselves harmless, had been produced by child labor. The
Adamson Act of 1916," imposing maximum hours and minimum wages
on the railroads, was another."0
They were followed in due course by the New Deal 3' and the passage of
the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of 19332 and 1938 ,' 3 regulating
something as local as the amount of wheat farmers could grow for
consumption on their own farms; the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934,23
538.
226. See infra notes 227-246 and accompanying text. Additionally, it must be
understood that this is not a "cause and effect" argument; clearly, many factors account
for the rapid expansion of the national government, with World War I, continued
industrial growth, and breakthroughs in electronic communications being chief among
them. Moreover, as Bybee acknowledges, it is "a maddeningly difficult proposition to
prove" the exact effects of direct election of senators. Bybee, supra note 2, at 547.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment removed a
previously-existing constitutional brake on these centralizing tendencies, and that
federalism, as Zywicki has pointed out, has been reduced to "a pale imitation of its pre-
Seventeenth Amendment vigor." Zywicki, supra note 6, at 212.
227. Pub. L. 64-249, 39 Stat. 675 (1916).
228. Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
229. Pub. L. No. 64-252, 39 Stat. 721 (1916).
230. According to one scholar, "Conventional wisdom states that the New Deal
commenced a radical shift in the scope of the federal government. In fact, the growth in
the federal government began almost immediately after the passage of the Progressive
Era amendments.... The New Deal simply confirmed the constitutional revolution
which had already transpired." Zywicki, supra note 6, at 174-75.
231. Zywicki states that:
Roosevelt's New Deal would not have been possible without the institutional
changes caused by the Progressive Era amendments. The Sixteenth
Amendment allowed for the federal government to raise revenues on an
unprecedented scale. At the same time, the Seventeenth Amendment
destroyed the systems of federalism and bicameralism which had previously
checked expansionist federal activity.
Id. at 233.
232. Pub. L. No. 73-10,48 Stat. 31(1933).
233. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31(1938).
234. Pub. L. No. 73-485,48 Stat. 1283 (1934).
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establishing a compulsory retirement and pension system for all carriers
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act; the National Industrial Recovery
Act of 19332" and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,26 regulating
wages and hours for those engaged in interstate commerce; the Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act of 1935, 7 regulating production and labor in the
coal industry; the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,' 8 protecting the
rights of workers to form unions and to bargain collectively; the Social
Security Act of 1935, 2 establishing a retirement plan for persons over the
age of sixty-five; and the National Housing Act of 1937,m providing
authority to lend money to local agencies for public housing.
There is no lack of more recent examples as well. They include the Fair
Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974,24 extending minimum
wage/maximum hours requirements to the employees of states and their
political subdivisions; the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, 2
4
conditioning a state's receipt of a portion of federal highway funding on
whether it had raised the drinking age to twenty-one; the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,243 mandating that the
states themselves must take title to radioactive waste within their borders if
they fail otherwise to provide for its disposition; the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act of 1993,4 mandating that state law-enforcement
officers must conduct background checks for all individuals wishing to buy
handguns; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,24' barring all
governments (federal, state, or local) from burdening free exercise of
religion without a compelling state interest; the National Voter Registration
Act of 1993,246 requiring state departments of motor vehicles to distribute
voter registration forms to those applying for driver's licenses or
automobile registration; and, of course, scores of other equally intrusive but
lower-profile federal mandates on the states and their political
subdivisions."?
235. Pub. L. No. 73-67,48 Stat. 195 (1933).
236. Pub. L. No. 75-718,52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
237. Pub. L. No. 74-402,49 Stat. 991 (1935).
238. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
239. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
240. Pub. L. No. 75-412,50 Stat. 888 (1937).
241. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
242. Pub. L. No. 98-363, 98 Stat. 437 (1984).
243. Pub. L. No. 99-240,99 Stat. 1842 (1986).
244. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
245. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
246. Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).
247. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, barring private discrimination in public
accommodations, the Civil Rights Act of 1968, prohibiting discrimination in housing,
and the Voting Rights Acts of 1965 and 1982 are not included as examples, because the
Congress (including the pre-Seventeenth Amendment Senate) had demonstrated
throughout the post-Civil War era a repeated willingness to use its enforcement powers
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Not only have these post-Seventeenth Amendment congressional
measures increased in number and intrusiveness, they have also become,
in Theodore J. Lowi's terms, more abstract, general, novel,
discretionary, and prescriptive (in contrast to earlier pre-Seventeenth
Amendment legislation that was more concrete, specific, traditional,
rule-bound, and proscriptive).248 This development has led to what Lowi
calls "policy without law"249 and has weakened not only the states but the
Congress itself-after all, with the Senate no longer answerable to state
legislatures, it has felt increasingly free to join the House in legislating
on every social, economic, or political problem which it perceives as
confronting the nation, even if the resulting measures are little more than
blank checks of authority to the executive branch and the federal
bureaucracy. °
The Supreme Court's initial reaction to this congressional expansion of
national power at the expense of the states was to attempt to fill the gap
created by the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment and to protect
federalism by invalidating congressional measures either on dual
federalism grounds or through its narrow construction of the Commerce
Clause. Using its power of judicial review in a manner never anticipated
by the founding generation and never practiced or endorsed by the
Marshall Court, it attempted to draw strict lines between federal and state
power. These, however, were lines that the Founders denied could be
drawn, saw no need to draw given the mode of electing the Senate, and
neither intended nor authorized the Court to draw, identify, or enforce.
Nonetheless, the Court came to regard its own analytical judgments
concerning the limits of the powers of the federal government as an
appropriate (and necessary) substitute for the now-displaced structural
solution of the Founders. Perceiving the popularly-elected Senate as no
longer able to protect federalism, the Court undertook to perform that task
itself, and, during the period from the ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1913 to its jurisprudential turnabout in the Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp2"l decision in 1937, it did exactly that, invalidating
more federal statutes on federalism grounds during that quarter of a
under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to enact legislation
regulating what was once thought to be exclusively within the province of the states.
248. See Lowi, supra note 181, at 134-35.
249. Id. at 126.
250. For a lengthy discussion of the effect of the Seventeenth Amendment on the
delegation of lawmaking authority, see Amar, supra note 215, at 1360-89.
251. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
century than it had during the entire period prior to the ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment. 3
The Supreme Court became a passionate defender of the original federal
design. It seemed completely unaware, however, that the Seventeenth
Amendment had fundamentally altered that original design by making the
Constitution both much more democratic and much less federal. It made
the Constitution much more democratic because the people would
thereafter directly elect the Senate, and it made the Constitution much less
federal because those senators would no longer represent the interests of
the states as such but rather of the people who would elect them.24 By
altering who the Senate represents and how federalism is protected, the
Seventeenth Amendment altered the very meaning of federalism itself.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to acknowledge this fact. While
fond of quoting Chief Justice Marshall's words in Marbury v. Madison 5
that it is the duty of the courts to interpret the Constitution and to say what
the law is,26 it curiously but steadfastly refused to allow the Seventeenth
Amendment and its structural and democratic consequences to enter its
interpretation of the Constitution. It refused to recognize that, after the
Seventeenth Amendment, federalism had changed 7 and the original
federal design was no longer controlling; it was no more a part of the
252. During that period, it invalidated ten congressional measures. See Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513 (1936); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110
(1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Hopkins Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Tnisler v.
Crooks, 269 U.S. 475 (1926); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
253. During the entire period prior to the ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment, the Court invalidated seven congressional measures. See Coyle v. Smith,
221 U.S. 559 (1911); Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909); Howard v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co., 207 U.S. 463 (1908); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); United
States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1878); United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870);
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). An eighth statute considered in
In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905), could possibly be added here. However, the Court
explicitly overturned In re Heff in United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), and,
consequently, it is not included in the totals. See infra note 270 for a discussion of these
cases.
254. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
In that connection, consider also the Sixteenth Amendment, which was ratified, as
George Anastaplo has noted, "primarily in order to expand the power of the General
Government.... The Sixteenth Amendment is still another indication that citizens can
be dealt with directly by the General Government, without any mediation by the States in
any way." GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONsTITuTION: A
COMMENTARY 187 (1995).
255. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
256. See id. at 176.
257. See infra note 309 and accompanying text (arguing that federalism actually
died with the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment).
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Constitution they were to interpret than was, after the ratification of the
post-Civil War Amendments, the Constitution's original accommodation
of slavery.
A. Dual Federalism
The Court's post-Seventeenth Amendment defense of the original
federal design began with Hammer v. Dagenhart,28 in which it invalidated
on dual-federalism grounds the Federal Child Labor Act of 1916. In that
act, Congress had prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
produced in factories that employed children under the age of fourteen or
that permitted children under the age of sixteen to work at night or for
more than eight hours a day. The Court asserted that the states were
coequal sovereigns with the federal government, that each level of
government was supreme within its own sphere, and that the federal
government could not therefore undertake any action, even in the exercise
of its enumerated powers, that touched upon those functions the
Constitution had reserved to the states. According to Justice William Day
in his majority opinion, the regulation of child labor was a "matter purely
local in its character and over which no authority has been delegated to
Congress in conferring the power to regulate commerce among the
states. ' '  Therefore, he concluded, because control over child labor was
vested in the states under their traditional police power, Congress could not
employ its delegated power to regulate commerce among the several states
to interfere in this matter. This conclusion was, of course, in striking
contrast to the Court's unanimous, pre-Seventeenth Amendment opinion
in Hoke v. United States,' in which it held, harking back to Gibbons,
that "Congress['s]... power over transportation 'among the several
States' ... is complete in itself," and that rules adopted under the
Commerce Clause "may have the quality of police regulations." 26'
When Congress thereupon passed the Federal Child Labor Tax Law of
1919, banning the use of child labor by imposing a ten percent tax on the
profits of all businesses engaged in interstate commerce that employed
children, the Court again used dual federalism to invalidate the measure in
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.262 Chief Justice William Howard Taft
258. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
259. Id. at 276.
260. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
261. Id. at 323.
262. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (commonly referred to as the Child Labor Tax Case).
reiterated Justice Day's point in Hammer that the regulation of child labor
was "a purely state authority" 63 and argued that, just as the first child labor
act "was not in fact regulation of interstate commerce, but rather that of
State concerns,"264 so, too, the second child labor act was not really a tax
but a penalty to reach and regulate what the Constitution had reserved
exclusively for state control.26
These cases are well known; less well-known is Hill v. Wallace,2 6 in
which the Court declared that Bailey "completely covers this case" and
held unconstitutional a provision of the Future Trading Act of 1921 that
imposed a tax "of 20 cents a bushel involved in every contract of sale of
grain for future delivery [except] where such contracts are made by or
through a member of the Board of Trade designated by the Secretary of
Agriculture as a contract market." '  Chief Justice Taft condemned the
provision as "a complete regulation of [state] boards of trade" and
therefore not "a valid exercise of the taxing power.'29
The Court's use of dual federalism in Hammer, Bailey, and Hill was
unfortunate. Prior to these cases, its most notorious use of dual federalism
was in Chief Justice Roger Taney's infamous majority opinion in Dred
Scott, wherein he argued that Congress's attempt through the Missouri
Compromise of 1820 to limit the spread of slavery in the territory of the
United States unconstitutionally infringed on the states' reserved power to
legislate on slavery.'7 Taney made the bizarre argument that Congress's
263. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276.
264. Bailey, 259 U.S. at 39.
265. See id.
266. 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
267. Id. at 67.
268. Id. at 64.
269. Id. at 66-67. The Court also held that Congress was attempting to regulate
commerce that was wholly between persons contracting within the State of Illinois
respecting the purchase or sale of grain which formed a part of the common property of
that state and that it was therefore intrastate and not interstate. See id. at 68-69. Finally,
it held that the Congress violated the Tenth Amendment by interfering with the right of
Illinois to provide for and regulate the maintenance of grain exchanges within its borders
upon which were conducted the making of contracts that were merely intrastate
transactions. See id. at 67-68.
270. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Dred Scott was the
first and most notorious use of dual federalism, but there were four other cases prior to
Hammer in which the Court also used dual-federalism premises to invalidate
congressional measures. In United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870), the
Court held that Congress's general prohibition under the Commerce Clause of the sale of
naphtha for illuminating purposes if it were inflammable at a temperature of less than
110 degrees Fahrenheit was unconstitutional because "[s]tanding by itself, it is plainly a
regulation of police." Id. at 44. In United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1878), it held that
a provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, which penalized individuals who defrauded
creditors by obtaining credit with the intention of thereafter commencing bankruptcy
proceedings, was a police regulation not within the bankruptcy power of the Congress
and was therefore unconstitutional. See id. at 672-73. In In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488
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power under Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution to regulate the
territory of the United States was, in fact, limited simply to that territory
which at the time the Constitution was ratified "belonged to, or was
claimed by, the United States... and can have no influence upon a
territory afterwards acquired from a foreign Government."27' The
Congress, Taney insisted, could acquire and regulate new territory only as
a "trustee" or "agent" of "the people of the several States'272 and could
exercise no power under the Constitution over the slave property of the
people "beyond what that instrument confers, nor lawfully deny any right
which it has reserved." 273  Taney, therefore, held that Congress acted
unconstitutionally when it passed the Missouri Compromise and prohibited
the spread of slavery into that portion of the Louisiana Purchase north of
thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude.274
Taney's opinion in Dred Scott stands in stark contrast to Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch. Marshall began his opinion by acknowledging that
the question of the limits of Congress's delegated powers had to be
"decided peacefully" or it would "remain a source of hostile legislation,
(1905), it held that a federal statute regulating the sale of intoxicating liquor to
reservation Indians violated the principles of dual federalism as "[t]he regulation of the
sale of intoxicating liquors.., is within the domain of state jurisdiction." Id. at 505.
However, it expressly overturned Heff in United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
"As, therefore, these allottees remain tribal Indians and under national guardianship, the
power of Congress to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor to them... is
not debatable." Id. at 601. Finally, in Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909), it
held that a provision in the Immigration Act of 1907 that penalized "whoever shall keep,
maintain, control, support, or harbor in any house or other place, for the purpose of
prostitution... any alien woman or girl, within three years after she shall have entered
the United States" was an exercise of the state's reserved police power and not within the
control of Congress over immigration. Id. at 139 (emphasis omitted).
271. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 432. See CURRIE, supra note 149, at 269
(stating that "Taney's construction seems singularly unpersuasive; he might as
convincingly have argued that the ex post facto clause applied only to the thirteen
original states." (footnote omitted)).
272. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 448.
273. Id. at 450.
274. Taney also invoked the Fifth Amendment and found the Missouri Compromise
unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds:
[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his
liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property
into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no
offen[s]e against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due
process of law.
Id. Nothing in the Constitution, Taney added, "gives Congress a greater power over
slave property, or... entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any
other description." Id. at 452.
perhaps of hostility of a still more serious nature."275 His answer to that
question was to declare that, because the Congress was as "equally"
representative of the people and the states as the state legislatures
themselves, it was up to the "Congress alone... [to] make the election" of
where "the respective powers" of the federal government ended and those
of the states began. 6 He adopted Madison's and Hamilton's "means-
ends" approach to constitutional interpretation, emphasizing as well the
importance of taking into consideration long-standing practice when
considering the limits of congressional power. Taney, by contrast,
employed the principle of dual federalism and flatly refused to allow
Congress to "elect" what it considered to be appropriate means to the ends
of the Constitution. He also totally ignored Congress's long-standing
practice of regulating the Louisiana Purchase. By denying to Congress
what Marshall fully granted, Taney and his dual-federalism premises
helped bring about that very "hostility of a still more serious nature"
Marshall feared.2"
Prudentially, it was not wise for Day or Taft to ground their findings of
unconstitutionality on the logic of Dred Scott. Their failing, however, goes
beyond a lack of prudence. Dual federalism, even prior to the ratification
of the Seventeenth Amendment and its fundamental alteration of
federalism, was vulnerable to one devastating objection, cogently
expressed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent in Hammer:
[If an act is within the powers specifically conferred upon Congress, it seems to
me that it is not made any less constitutional because of the indirect effects that
it may have, however obvious it may be that it will ha,,p those effects, and that
we are not at liberty upon such grounds to hold it void.
In their efforts to overcome this objection, both Day and Taft were
forced implicitly to rewrite the Commerce and Tax Clauses so that they
would read: Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the
several states or to lay and collect taxes, unless these powers interfere with
the domestic policies of a state. Justice Day felt compelled to go even
further and explicitly rewrite the Tenth Amendment as well, declaring that
"the Nation is made up of States to which are entrusted the powers of local
government. And to them and to the people the powers not expressly
delegated to the National Government are reserved."279 In so doing, he
275. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,400-01 (1819).
276. Id. at 401,424.
277. One scholar has noted that, "From a lawyer's viewpoint, Scott was a
disreputable performance. The variety of feeble, poorly developed, and unnecessary
constitutional arguments suggests, if nothing else, a determination to reach a
predetermined conclusion at any price." CURRm, supra note 149, at 272.
278. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
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denied the historical record; when the First Congress considered what
would become the Tenth Amendment, it flatly rejected a proposal by
Elbridge Gerry to insert into it the word "expressly." ' He also ignored
judicial precedent; in McCulloch, Marshall held that, because the word
"expressly" had been intentionally omitted from the Amendment, the
question of whether Congress could exercise a particular power was to be
answered by "a fair construction of the whole instrument."'
Day appears to have been driven to these lengths because of his belief
that the Court was the only defender of federalism.
The far reaching result of upholding the act cannot be more plainly indicated
than by pointing out that if Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to local
authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in interstate
commerce, all freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the
States over local matters2ay be eliminated, and thus our system of government
be practically destroyed.
He failed to appreciate that the original federal design (which, of course,
is what Day means when he speaks of "our system of government") was, if
not "destroyed," then surely profoundly altered by the Seventeenth
Amendment."3 Moreover, he seems wholly unaware that there is simply
no historical evidence to suggest that the people who, in the name of
democracy, ratified the Seventeenth Amendment, intended to transfer the
power to protect that original federal design from the indirectly-elected
Senate to an appointed Court so that it might invalidate the very measures
now passed by their democratically-elected Senate.24
280. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTs, supra note 72, at 51, 199.
281. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,406 (1819).
282. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276.
283. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
284. Bybee states,
It is unclear that the Supreme Court should be responsible for
guaranteeing the role of the states and protecting the people from themselves.
The Seventeenth Amendment took the power to elect senators from state
legislatures (which, after all, represent people) and gave it to the people (who
would now represent themselves). It seems to me that states as political
entities in a federal system were more aggressively represented in Congress
through their legislatures, but since the Constitution now provides otherwise,
the people cannot complain about the Court when the people demanded control
of the Senate and then failed to exercise it with the same vigilance as their
legislatures.
Bybee, supra note 2, at 568.
For a different understanding of the relationship between the Seventeenth Amendment
and the Supreme Court, see Brooks, supra note 17, at 208-09.
Because the Seventeenth Amendment was not intended to reduce that zone of
B. Narrow Construction of the Commerce Clause
The deficiencies of dual federalism quickly became apparent, and the
Court no longer employed it to invalidate a congressional enactment after
Trusler v. Crook?5 in 1926.2 6 Rather, the Court shifted its ground and
found offensive federal legislation unconstitutional based on its narrow
reading of the Commerce Clause and its use of the "direct effects/indirect
effects" test. It did so by abandoning Marshall's expansive understanding
of the Commerce Clause as he articulated it in Gibbons. "[Tihe word
'commerce,' the Court now insisted, "is the equivalent of the phrase
'intercourse for the purposes of trade."' 7 On that basis, it denied that
the Congress had plenary power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
agriculture in United States v. Butler 8 and mining in Carter v. Carter
Coal Co.n9
state sovereignty, it did not lessen the pre-existing constitutional right of States
to exercise their reserved sovereignty unhindered.... As a result, the Supreme
Court cannot properly excuse itself from judging whether a challenged federal
law does violate that state sovereignty.
Id.
285. 269 U.S. 475 (1926). In Trusler, the Court invalidated Section 3 of the Future
Trading Act of 1921, which imposed a tax of 20 cents per bushel on all options trading.
The Court held that its purpose was not to raise revenue but rather was simply to ban, by
penalty, the use of options altogether. See id. at 482.
286. The Court continued to make dual-federalism arguments in United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), but it did
not base its conclusion that the underlying statutes at issue in these cases were
unconstitutional on that basis. In fact, it did not officially repudiate the use of the
principle of dual federalism in interpreting the Commerce Clause until United States v.
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941), when it explicitly overturned Hammer v.
Dagenhart. It should be noted, moreover, that several members of the Court continued
to employ dual-federalism principles in matters of taxation. See United States v.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), for example, where both the majority opinion by Justice
Stanley Reed and the dissent by Justice Felix Frankfurter employed dual-federalism
reasoning. Justice Frankfurter was quite emphatic in defending this form of reasoning.
[W]hen oblique use is made of the taxing power as to matters which
substantively are not within the powers delegated to Congress, the Court
cannot shut its eyes to what is obviously, because designedly, an attempt to
control conduct which the Constitution left to the responsibility of the States,
merely because Congress wrapped the legislation in the verbal cellophane of a
revenue measure.
Id. at 38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See C. HERmA.N PRrrcHrT, THE AMERICAN
CONsTrrrrION 239-40 (2d ed. 1968).
287. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 303.
288. 297U.S. 1(1935).
289. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). The Court stated:
[T]he word "commerce" is the equivalent of the phrase 'intercourse for the
purposes of trade.' Plainly, the incidents leading up to and culminating in the
mining of coal do not constitute such intercourse. The employment of men,
the fixing of their wages, hours of labor and working conditions, the
bargaining in respect of these things-whether carried on separately or
collectively-each and all constitute intercourse for the purposes of
724
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These, of course, were not the first cases in which the Court had
narrowed Marshall's expansive language in Gibbons. In United States v.
E. C. Knight Co. in 1895,2 the Court asserted that "[clommerce succeeds
to manufacture, and is not a part of it' 291 and, on that basis, held that the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 could not be used against the American
Sugar Refining Company and its monopoly control of the nation's sugar
refining business. 29z  It was not, however, until the post-Seventeenth
Amendment era that the Court began to declare federal statutes
unconstitutional based on its narrow definition of commerce. 3
Unlike Marshall in Gibbons, the Court in the initial post-Seventeenth
Amendment era was simply unwilling to trust "the wisdom and discretion
of [C]ongress" as "the sole restraints" to "secure" the people from
congressional "abuse" of the commerce clause.294 It saw the very principle
of federalism itself as hanging in the balance. As Justice George
Sutherland noted in his majority opinion in Carter Coal Co.:
Every journey to a forbidden end begins with the first step; and the danger of
such a step by the federal government in the direction of taking over the powers
of the states is that the end of the journey may find the states so despoiled of
their powers, or-what may amount to the same thing-so relieved of the
responsibilities which possession of the powers necessarily enjoins, as to reduce
them to little more than geographical subdivisions of the national domain. It is
safe to say that if, when the Constitution was under consideration, it had been
thought that any such danger lurked behind its plain words, it would never have
production, not of trade. The latter is a thing apart from the relation of
employer and employee, which in all producing occupations, is purely local in
character. Extraction of coal from the mine is the aim and the completed result
of local activities. Commerce in the coal mined is not brought into being by
force of these activities, but by negotiations, agreements, and circumstances
entirely apart from production. Mining brings the subject matter of commerce
into existence. Commerce disposes of it.
Id. at 303-04. Also, see Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330
(1935), in which the Court held that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce
did not extend to regulations related to the social welfare of the worker. These
regulations were based on the theory that, by engendering contentment and a sense of
personal security, they would induce more efficient service. See id. at 367.
290. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
291. Id. at 12.
292. See id. at 16-18.
293. See Rickert Rice Mills, Inc. v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1936), in which the
Court held that the infirmities of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which were
the bases for holding it unconstitutional in Butler, had not been cured by the Amendatory
Act of August 24, 1935, as that act likewise was a means for effectuating the regulation
of agricultural production and was not, therefore, a matter within the powers of
Congress. See id. at 113.
294. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
been ratified.295
Sutherland seemed unaware that the people who ratified the
Constitution feared no such danger, for they were secure in the
knowledge that the mode of electing the Senate would ensure that the
states would not be reduced to geographical subdivisions. The
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment removed that democratic and
structural protection of federalism and apparently warranted, in the
minds of the members of the Court majority in these cases, the Court's
activist intervention. Since this judicial protection was neither
democratically nor structurally based, it was destined to fail.
In E.C. Knight, the Court acknowledged that, while sugar
manufacturing was not commerce, it nevertheless could affect interstate
commerce."' It insisted, however, that the American Sugar Refining
Company was not covered by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, because its
monopoly control of sugar refining affected commerce "only
incidentally and indirectly."2  The Court thereby introduced a crucial
distinction between intrastate activities having a "direct effect" on
commerce (and therefore subject to congressional regulation) and
intrastate activities having only an "indirect effect" on commerce (and
therefore beyond Congress's reach). Again, however, it was not until
after the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified that the Court began to
use this "direct effects/indirect effects" test to invalidate, as opposed to
merely limiting the reach of, a federal statute. It did this for the first
time in 1935, when it held in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States"' that the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 was
unconstitutional because, inter alia, Congress was attempting to regulate
295. 298 U.S. at 295-96. See Hopkins Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S.
315 (1935); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S.
513 (1936). In Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, the Court held that the provision
of the Federal Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 permitting a state building and loan
association to convert itself into a federal savings and loan association without the
consent of the state that created it was an unconstitutional encroachment upon the
reserved powers of the states. See Hopkins Fed. Say. & Loan, 296 U.S. at 335. In
Ashton, it held that a 1934 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act permitting municipal
corporations and other political subdivisions of the states unable to pay their debts as
they matured to resort to the federal courts of bankruptcy to effect readjustment of
obligations was likewise unconstitutional for it trenched on the reserved powers of the
states. See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530. "If obligations of States or their political
subdivisions may be subjected to the interference here attempted, they are no longer free
to manage their own affairs; the will of Congress prevails over them." Id. at 531.
296. See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12.
297. Id. "Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves
in a certain sense the control of its disposition, but this is a secondary and not the
primary sense." Id.
298. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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intrastate acts that only indirectly affected interstate commerce.2" The
next year in Carter Coal, it again employed this test to find Congress's
efforts to regulate coal production unconstitutional* °
In Schechter, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes confidently asserted
that the distinction between a direct and an indirect effect was "clear in
principle";" 1 however, just one year later in Carter Coal, Justice
Sutherland confessed that, "[w]hether the effect of a given activity or
condition is direct or indirect is not always easy to determine."302
Struggling to articulate a distinction, he declared that "[t]he word 'direct'
implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed shall operate
proximately-not mediately, remotely, or collaterally-to produce the
effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient intervening agency or
condition."3 3 And, he continued, "the extent of the effect bears no logical
relation to its character. The distinction between a direct and an indirect
effect turns, not upon the magnitude of either the cause or the effect, but
entirely upon the manner in which the effect has been brought about."3
He acknowledged that "[ilt is quite true that rules of law are sometimes
qualified by considerations of degree," but he insisted that "the matter of
degree has no bearing upon the question here, since that question is not-
What is the extent of the local activity or condition, or the extent of the
effect produced upon interstate commerce? but-What is the relation
between the activity or condition and the effect?""3 5  Sutherland's
clarification was, of course, completely unhelpful, and it came as no
surprise that, in Jones & Laughlin, decided during its next term, the Court
totally abandoned the "direct effect/indirect effect" test and held that, if
intrastate activities '"ave such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the
power to exercise that control."306
With its decision in Jones & Laughlin, the Court abandoned its defense
of federalism; no longer would it attempt to draw lines that the Founders
denied could be drawn and that they never intended the Court to try to
299. See id. at 546.
300. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936).
301. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546.
302. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 307.
303. Id. at 307-08.
304. Id. at 308.
305. Id.
306. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
draw;... no longer would it attempt to define narrowly a congressional
power that was, in fact, plenary. David Currie argues that with Jones &
Laughlin, "constitutional federalism died.""" A better formulation still
would have been to declare that federalism died in 1913, with the
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment,3" but that it took until 1937 for
the Supreme Court to learn this lesson.
What it took the Court a quarter of a century to learn, it took it another
thirty-nine years to forget. In 1976, in National League of Cities v.
Usery,"° the Court attempted once again to breathe life into the corpse of
federalism when it held that Congress could not exercise its power under
the Commerce Clause "in a fashion that would impair the States' 'ability to
function effectively in a federal system."' 3" Announcing for a bare
majority that Congress lacked the power "to directly displace the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions," 12  Justice William Rehnquist declared
unconstitutional the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act that
extended maximum hours and minimum wage requirements to employees
of states and their political subdivisions.
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to
determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to
carry out their governmental functions, what hours those persons will work, and
what compensatioll3will be provided where these employees may be called upon
to work overtime.
The federal design created by the Founders obliged the Court to rule as it
did, or so Justice Rehnquist asserted: "If Congress may withdraw from the
States the authority to make those fundamental employment decisions upon
which their systems for performance of these functions must rest, we think
307. But see Brooks, supra note 17, at 210. Brooks argues that "[t]he Court
certainly recognizes that a constitutional line between state and federal authority exists; it
regularly strikes down state laws as encroaching on federal prerogatives." Id. See
Zywicki, supra note 6, at 228. Brooks, however, refuses to recognize that, from the
founding onward, it is the Congress and not the Court that is to draw the line between
state and federal authority. He also fails to understand that, when the Court strikes down
state laws that encroach on federal power, it is not drawing the line itself but merely
enforcing, consistent with the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, the line Congress has
drawn.
308. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITrrTION IN THE SUPREME COuRT: THE SECOND
CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 238 (1990).
309. It is with the hope of resuscitating federalism that Bybee is led to propose that
the Seventeenth Amendment be repealed. See Bybee, supra note 2, at 568. Zywicki
agrees that this is a "good idea" but quickly concedes that "[tihe tide of democracy is
generally difficult to contain, much less reverse." Zywicki, supra note 6, at 226.
310. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
311. Id. at 852 (citation omitted).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 845.
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there would be little left of the States' 'separate and independent
existence.' 31 4 The implication was clear. In the absence of the structural
protection of federalism provided by the original mode of electing the
Senate, Marshall's arguments in Gibbons were no longer valid, and
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause could no longer be
considered "plenary";35 rather, it must be understood as limited by the
Court's judgment concerning what "would impair the States' 'ability to
function effectively in the federal system. ' '316 It needs to be underscored,
however, that Rehnquist was speaking about the federal system as
originally designed, not as fundamentally altered by the adoption and
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.
Eight years later, the Court again abandoned its efforts to defend
federalism in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority;37 it
explicitly overturned National League of Cities and held that
government-owned mass-transit systems were indeed subject to the
obligations of the Fair Labor Standards Act."' It confessed that it was
unable to draw the line, on which the logic of National League of Cities
fundamentally depended, between "traditional" governmental functions
that the Court was to protect from congressional interference and
"nontraditional" or "proprietary" functions performed by state and local
governments that the Congress was allowed to regulate.319 "We doubt
that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional limitations
on the scope of the Congress's Commerce Clause powers over the States
merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty."32
Justice Harry Blackmun held for the majority, but, as in National
League of Cities itself, only for a bare majority, that the protection of
federalism must come from the political process, not the courts. 32' The
principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the states in
the federal system lies in the structure of the federal government itself.
He elaborated:
It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was
314. Id. at 851 (citation omitted).
315. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1824).
316. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 (citation omitted). But see CURRIE,
supra note 308, at 564-65 (defending Rehnquist's opinion).
317. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
318. See id. at 531.
319. See id. at 539, 545.
320. Id. at 548.
321. See id. at 556-57.
designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. The
Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive and
the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. The States were vested
with indirect influence over the House of Representatives and the Presidency by
their control of electoral qualifications and their role in Presidential elections.
They were given more direct influence in the Senate, where each State received
equal representation and each Senator was to be selected by the legislature of
his State. The significance attached to the States' equal representation in the
Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any constitutional jliendment
divesting a State of equal representation without the State's consent.
Blackmun's language, while an accurate-enough description of how
federalism was originally protected,3  was nonetheless misleading in a
crucial respect: He maintained the fiction that federalism is currently
protected structurally.3  With this assertion, Blackmun showed that he,
no less than Rehnquist in National League of Cities, had forgotten the
fundamental lesson of the Seventeenth Amendment, viz., that federalism
was dead. Blackmun did acknowledge
that changes in the structure of the Federal Government have taken place since
1789, not the least of which has been the substitution of popular election of
Senators by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, and that these
changes.aay work to alter the influence of the States in the federal political
process.
He nevertheless insisted that the structural limitation "that the
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the
'States as States' remained sufficiently in place and that federalism
retained its vitality.326
As proof that federalism was alive and well, Blackmun noted that,
while the Congress had subjected state mass-transit systems to federal
wage-and-hours obligations, it had simultaneously provided extensive
322. Id. at 550-51 (citations omitted).
323. Blackmun mentions the mode of electing the Senate only in passing and places
most of his emphasis on equal representation of the states in the Senate. His argument is
reminiscent of the Senate Committee Report in 1896 responding to Congressman
Bartlett. See supra note 216.
324. See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), in which Justice
William Brennan declared that the "limits on Congress' authority to regulate state
activities" set out in Garcia "are structural, not substantive-i.e., that States must find
their protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not
through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity." Id. at 512 (emphasis
omitted).
325. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
326. Id. Amar argues that the Court removed itself from the business of protecting
state entities from the application of federal law "largely on the theory that the federal
structure enables state governmental entities to protect themselves through the political
process. I think it fair to say that Justice Blackmun's opinion did not really grapple with
the fundamental change in that structure reflected by direct election." Amar, supra note
215, at 1380 (citation omitted).
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funding (over $22 billion) for state and local mass transit 27 He reported
that:
Congress has not simply placed a financial burden on the shoulders of States
and localities that operate mass transit systems, but has provided substantial
countervailing financial assistance as well, assistance that may leave individual
mass-transit systems better 3ojf than they would have been had Congress never
intervened at all in the area.
Blackmun therefore drew what he considered to be the only
conclusion: "Congress' treatment of public mass transit reinforces our
conviction that the national political process systematically protects
States from the risk of having their functions in that area handicapped by
Commerce Clause regulation."329  Blackmun's evidence, however,
utterly fails to support his contention that the current constitutional
structure actually protects the interests of "States as States" or that
constitutional federalism retains any vitality whatsoever. Quite the
contrary, it shows only that, in the post-Seventeenth Amendment era,
members of Congress will look after the interests of those subordinate to
them and that the states have now been reduced to that subordinate
status. Whereas, for the Founders, senators could be trusted to look after
the interests of the states because the state legislatures were their
masters, for Blackmun and his colleagues, the members of Congress can
be trusted to look after the interests of the states because the states are
now their supplicants whose well-being depends on their sufferance.
What Justice Antonin Scalia said of the Lemon test330 in Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Distric?3" can also be
said of the corpse of federalism: It is "[1]ike some ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,
after being repeatedly killed and buried.,3312 It is therefore not surprising
that, eleven years after Garcia, the Court's desire to exhume the original
federal design and to draw lines between the Congress's permissible and
impermissible use of its Commerce Clause power once again became
327. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. The Lemon test is a three-part test introduced by Chief Justice Warren Burger
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), to determine whether a statute violates the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause.
331. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
332. Id. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring).
irresistible. In United States v. Lopez,333 it declared unconstitutional the
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, not because it trenched on state
integrity or the attributes of state sovereignty but simply because it
exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause." Reviewing case law,
Chief Justice Rehnquist held for what was again a bare majority that the
Congress can regulate intrastate activity only when it "'substantially
affects' interstate commerce., 335 Did possession of a handgun within
1000 feet of a school substantially affect interstate commerce? The
federal government in its defense of the statute and the four Justices in
the minority said "yes," claiming that possession of a firearm in a school
zone may result in violent crime and that violent crime can be expected
to affect the functioning of the national economy because the costs of
violent crime are substantial and because violent crime reduces the
willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are
perceived to be unsafe. 36 They also claimed that the presence of guns in
schools poses a substantial threat to the educational process by
threatening the learning environment and that a handicapped educational
process, in turn, results in a less-productive citizenry, thereby adversely
affecting the nation's economic well-being.337 However, Rehnquist and
his colleagues in the majority said "no," insisting that if they were to
accept the federal government's argument, it would be
difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been
sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we [would
be] hard pressed tgposit any activity by an individual that Congress is without
power to regulate.
Rehnquist admitted "legal uncertainty" concerning whether "an
intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial, 339 and he
acknowledged that there were no "precise formulations"' ' for what the
Congress could or could not regulate. He even conceded that "some of
our prior cases have taken long steps" down the road to "convert[ing]
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States" and that "[t]he broad language
in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional
expansion." ' Nonetheless, Rehnquist declined to take that next step.
333. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
334. See id. at 551.
335. Id. at 559.
336. See id. at 563-64 (opinion of the Court), 625-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
337. See id. at 564.
338. Id. at 564.
339. Id. at 566.
340. Id. at 567.
341. Id.
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Rather, he put his foot down and said "no," even though he never
provided a compelling explanation for why he had drawn where he had
the line between Congress's permissible and impermissible use of the
Commerce Clause.
Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in Lopez even as he rejected the
majority's use of the substantial-effects test. He declared that "much if
not all of Art[icle] I, [Section] 8 (including portions of the Commerce
Clause itself), would be surplusage if Congress had been given authority
over matters that substantially affect interstate commerce.''42  An
interpretation of the Commerce Clause that renders "the rest of [Section]
8 superfluous simply cannot be correct. Yet this Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence has endorsed just such an interpretation: The
power we have accorded Congress has swallowed Art[icle] I, [Section]
8."34' He attributed the growth of federal power to the Court's failure to
interpret the Commerce Clause correctly, but a more likely culprit was
the Seventeenth Amendment's elimination of the structural protection
that the election of the Senate by state legislatures had provided to
federalism.'
Thomas said that he awaited a future case in which the Court could
reconsider the substantial effects test and construct a new "standard" that
better "reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause."34' There
is, however, little reason to expect that future courts will be more
successful than past ones in drawing a clear line between the powers of
the federal and state governments. As Lino Graglia has noted, judicial
342. Id. at 589 (Thomas, J., concurring).
343. Id.
344. See id. at 584-85.
345. Interestingly, it was that very "absence of structural mechanisms" that
ultimately persuaded Justice Anthony Kennedy to join the majority opinion in Lopez.
See id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring). His vote was quite surprising in light of
statements he had made earlier in his concurring opinion. He acknowledged, for
example, that, unlike the "workable standards to assist in preserving separation of
powers and checks and balances" that the Court had developed, "[o]ur role in preserving
the federal balance seems more tenuous." Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He also
admitted that the conclusion
could be drawn from The Federalist Papers ... that the balance between
national and state power is entrusted in its entirety to the political process.
Madison's observation that 'the people ought not surely to be precluded from
giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due,'
can be interpreted to say that the essence of responsibility for a shift in power
from the State to the Federal Government rests upon a political judgment.
Id. at 577 (citation omitted). See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
346. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585.
second-guessing of Congress's use of its Commerce Clause power can
never effectively protect federalism, for
principled limits cannot be defined. Because the power to regulate interstate
commerce would seem necessarily to include the power to regulate things that
affect it, and all things affect it, the question is unavoidably one of degree. The
question presented in each case is not whether a particular activity affects
interstate commerce, but whether it affects it significantly enouQJj to justify
federal regulation, considering the loss of local autonomy involved.
Graglia states the inevitable conclusion: Because that question "is one
of magnitude (an empirical question), the Court is in no position to
contradict a (presumed) congressional determination of the substantiality
of the effect. It is difficult for the Court to contradict Congress's
definition of substantiality when it has no alternative definition of its
own."
348
A better approach in that "future case" would be for the Court to
announce that federalism died with the ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment, that the Court therefore is withdrawing explicitly from
reviewing congressional power under the Commerce Clause, and that it
will hereafter treat Commerce Clause questions as political questions,
acknowledging in the language of Baker v. CarM 9 that there are no
"judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" them
and that the resolution of these questions was "constitutional[ly]
commit[ted]" by the Founders "to a coordinate political department,""35
i.e., to the Congress with its House elected by the people and its Senate
whether elected indirectly by state legislatures or directly by the people.
C. Prohibition of the "Commandeering" of State Officials
While the Court has attempted, for the most part, to protect the
original federal design primarily through its use of dual-federalism
principles or its narrow construction of the Commerce Clause, as of late,
it has also begun to protect it by declaring that Congress lacks the power
347. Graglia, supra note 69, at 768-69.
348. Id. at 769. Graglia also stated,
Although the Constitution contemplates a federal system of divided
powers rather than a national system of totally centralized power, it is doubtful
that such a system can be made a matter of a judicially enforceable legal or
constitutional guarantee. Discussions of federalism that speak, as most do, of
the need to maintain separate 'spheres' or 'areas' of federal and state authority
and to maintain the 'boundaries' between them tend more to mislead than to
aid understanding of the problem. Political power is not a physical or spatial
entity subject to such a division.
Id. at 722.
349. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
350. Id. at 217.
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to "commandeer" state officials into carrying out federal programs. In
New York v. United States,35' the Court held unconstitutional a key
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985 that required a state that had failed to provide for the disposal of
all of its internally-generated waste by a particular date to take title to
and possession of that waste and become liable for all damages suffered
by the generator or owner of that waste as a result of the state's failure to
take prompt possession." 2 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a former state
legislator and state court judge, asserted for a six-member majority that,
No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply
does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate. The
Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly
and to pre-empt contrary state regulation. Where a federal interest is
sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legi§Jate, it must do so directly; it may
not conscript state governments as its agents.
Why does the Congress have the authority to regulate either directly or
through preemption but not through conscription or commandeering?
Because, O'Connor continued, coercing the states into enacting or
enforcing a federal regulatory program "infring[es] upon the core of
state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment" and "is
inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by
the Constitution."3
O'Connor acknowledged that the Tenth Amendment declares but "a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. 355
Nonetheless, she insisted that the Tenth Amendment is as enforceable
and contains limitations as identifiable as the First Amendment itself.
Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in
the Constitution. Thus, for example, under the Commerce Clause Congress
may regulate publishers engaged in interstate commerce, but Congress is
constrained in the exercise of that power by the First Amendment. The Tenth
Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not
derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have
discussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms
that the power of the Federal Governmenjis subject to limits that may, in a
given instance, reserve power to the States.
351. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
352. See id. at 149.
353. Id. at 178.
354. Id. at 177.
355. Id. at 156 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
356. Id. at 156-57.
How are these limits to be determined if they are not derived from the
text? O'Connor's exposition is unclear on this matter but the answer
apparently is that they come from the Court's own sense of its
responsibility to protect the original federal design and the core of state
sovereignty. As she asserts, "The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to
determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is
protected by a limitation on an Article I power." '357 How does a truism, a
tautology, help the Court to "determine" whether that core has been
penetrated by the federal government, whether the line separating
constitutionality from unconstitutionality has been crossed? It is a
question O'Connor sidesteps.
O'Connor's answers to the questions of what are the limits that the
Tenth Amendment imposes on the federal government and where is the
line to be drawn separating permissible from impermissible federal
legislation contrast strikingly with the answers of the founding
generation. Their entire understanding of the Tenth Amendment was
intimately connected to their understanding of federalism and their sense
of how it was protected by the mode they had provided for electing the
Senate. Senators could be trusted to scrutinize whether proposed federal
legislation would violate the "core of state sovereignty" and to refuse to
assent to it if it did. The Tenth Amendment was appropriately a truism,
for the mode of electing the Senate ensured that the reserved power of
the states would remain inviolable. Once the Seventeenth Amendment
was ratified, however, the Framers' structural answer to these questions
was no longer available, leaving O'Connor and her colleagues to choose
between only two other possible answers: trusting the line drawn by the
popular branches, or trusting the line they would draw. Not surprisingly,
O'Connor and her colleagues chose the answer most flattering to
themselves.
The issue of "commandeering" state officials surfaced again in Printz
v. United States,358 as the Court considered the constitutionality of that
provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 that
commanded state and local law-enforcement officers to conduct
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. Justice Scalia
held for a five-member majority that this congressional command was
"fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty" and therefore unconstitutional.*5 9 Contrary to O'Connor in
New York, Scalia acknowledged that there was no constitutional text, not
even the Tenth Amendment, that spoke to the precise question of
357. Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
358. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
359. Id. at 935.
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whether congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal
laws was unconstitutional.3" Therefore, he turned to three other sources:
historical understanding and practice, the structure of the Constitution,
and the Court's past decisions."'
Scalia began by researching historical understanding and practice. He
reviewed the actions of the early Congresses, observed that they
studiously "avoided use of this highly attractive power," and concluded
that "the power was thought not to exist."362 He would have been more
precise if he had concluded that the power to commandeer may indeed
have existed but that the Senate, representing the interests of the states as
states, simply refused to accede to its use.
Scalia then turned to the structure of the Constitution, where, most
interestingly, he ultimately found federal commandeering of state
officials to be unconstitutional not so much because it violated the
principles of federalism but because it violated separation of powers. He
noted that "[t]he Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to
administer the laws enacted by Congress; the President, it says, 'shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' personally and through
officers whom he appoints. 363  The Brady Act, however, effectively
transferred this responsibility to thousands of state and local law-
enforcement officers in the fifty states, who, as Scalia pointed out,
are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control (if
indeed meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint
and remove). The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal
Executive-to insure both vigor and accountability-is well known. That unity
would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to
reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without Me President as with
him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws.
This argument comes, of course, directly from his dissent in Morrison
v. Olson. In Morrison, Scalia wrote for himself alone; in Printz,
however, by sugarcoating his separation-of-powers argument with a
defense of federalism, he was able to write for a five-member majority
66
360. See id. at 905.
361. See id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 922 (citations omitted).
364. Id. at 922-23 (citations omitted).
365. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
366. Scalia's argument on the need to preserve separation of powers within the
federal government itself is reminiscent of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury.
See supra note 155.
Finally, Scalia turned to the Court's previous decisions on
commandeering. He found them "conclusive-, '" 367 although, given the
arm's-length distance he kept from the Tenth Amendment and in light of
the separation of powers argument he had just made, perhaps not wholly
persuasive.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court's most recent effort to protect federalism at the expense of
the democratic principle is City of Boerne v. Flores."' In it, the Court
found unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's powers under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.369 Section 5 states: "The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article.""37
Justice Anthony Kennedy held for a six-member majority that
Congress's enforcement power was limited to passing "measures that
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions" by the states and did not
extend to passing "measures that make a substantive change" in what the
Court has held the Constitution means."' He admitted that the "line"
between measures that are remedial and those that are substantive "is not
367. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925.
368. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
369. See id. at 536.
370. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
371. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. Contrast the contemporary Court's
understanding of Section 5 with the pre-Seventeenth Amendment Court's understanding
of that section (and confidence in the Congress's exercise of the power it confers) as
expressed in Exparte State of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
It is not said the judicial power of the general government shall extend to
enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities
guaranteed. It is not said that branch of the government shall be authorized to
declare void any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the
power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is authorized to
enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is
contemplated to make the amendments fully effective. Whatever legislation is
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in
view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain,
and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and
the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.
Id. at 345-46. The Ex Parte State of Virginia Court also stated:
Were it not for the fifth section of that amendment, there might be room for
argument that the first section is only declaratory of the moral duty of the
State.... But the Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional
interference and compulsion in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is but a limited authority, true, extending only to a single class
of cases; but within its limits it is complete.
Id. at 347-48.
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easy to discern"3 '2 and ultimately depends on how "flagrant" 3 3 the
violation was that the Congress sought to remedy. He noted, for
example, that, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,374 the Court held that Congress
could expand the fights for Spanish-speaking American citizens in
section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 without that measure
being considered substantive because the discrimination that Congress
sought to correct was flagrant "invidious discrimination."3 How did the
Court in Morgan know that the discrimination against Spanish-speaking
American citizens that section 4(e) addressed was flagrant?
Interestingly, it was not because the Congress had declared it to be so
but simply because the Court believed that it was. As Justice John
Marshall Harlan II pointed out in his Morgan dissent: "There were no
committee hearings or reports referring to this section [4(e)], which was
introduced from the floor during debate on the full Voting Rights Act." '76
By contrast, in City of Boerne, the Court held that Congress could not
expand the religious rights of Americans generally through the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act because, despite the extensive record
established through hearings in both the House and the Senate, the Court
was not persuaded that religious bigotry was widespread.3' For the
Court, the absence of widespread religious discrimination meant that
there was no need for a remedy, which, in turn, made the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act a substantive and, therefore, unconstitutional
measure. Such subjectivity and subterfuge was hardly becoming; neither
was its overt reliance on The Civil Rights Cases,"8 a decision in which
the Court held that Congress lacked the power to enforce the rights of
citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to blacks and,
therefore, the power to prohibit racial discrimination in public
accommodations.379 The Court, however, appeared not to care; it was
engaged in the important work of protecting "the federal balance."3S'
The Court's decision in City of Boerne is especially ironic. The Court
asserted that the Congress unconstitutionally exceeded the powers
372. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
373. Id. at 525.
374. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
375. Id. at 656.
376. Id. at 669 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
377. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531.
378. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
379. See id. at 25.
380. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
conferred on it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby
upset federalism. But, if ever there was an amendment intended to
enhance the power of Congress at the expense of the Court, it was the
Fourteenth Amendment. After all, it begins in Section 1 by explicitly
repudiating the Supreme Court's outrageous assertion in Dred Scott that
blacks could not be citizens of the United States, and it concludes in
Section 5 by giving to the Congress, and not to the Court, the power to
enforce its many provisions. Additionally, if ever there was an
amendment consciously intended to strengthen the power of Congress at
the expense of the states, it was also the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Civil War established on the fields of battle that we were indeed a
nation, not a confederacy, and the Fourteenth Amendment ratified that
fact, both in how it limited the states and in how it empowered the
Congress-the mode of electing the Senate ensured that Congress's new
powers under Section 5-would not be used to the destruction of the
states. Yet, in City of Boerne, the Court, in the name of federalism and
in the face of a virtually-unanimous Congress, arrogantly exercised its
power of judicial review. Its obsession with protecting the original
federal design, weakened by the Fourteenth Amendment and left without
structural support by the Seventeenth Amendment, was matched by its
complete disregard for the democratic principle embodied in the
Seventeenth Amendment.
In a January 27, 1838, speech to the Springfield Young Men's
Lyceum entitled "The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions,"
Abraham Lincoln described how the founding principles of the republic
were "fading" from view.38' He did not fear that they would ever be
entirely forgotten, only "that like every thing else, they must fade upon
the memory of the world, and grow more and more dim by the lapse of
time." 82  Nevertheless, Lincoln warned, the consequences were
profound. Those founding principles "were a fortress of strength; but,
what invading foeman could never do, the silent artillery of time has
done; the levelling of its walls."''
Lincoln's words describe perfectly the fate that has befallen the
original federal design. The Framers designed the Constitution so that
federalism was protected structurally through the election of the Senate
by state legislatures. Over time, however, the public's understanding of
the reasons for that structural protection faded, and the walls of
federalism were leveled by the ratification of the Seventeenth
381. Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions, in THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 11,20 (Richard N. Current ed., 1967).
382. Id.
383. Id.
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Amendment and the public's desire to make the Constitution more
democratic. Thus, the Seventeenth Amendment effectively killed
federalism, something that the public did not anticipate and that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly failed to appreciate. The Court has
sporadically attempted to rebuild the wall of federalism, but its efforts
have always failed, for, as it has candidly confessed, it cannot determine
exactly where the wall should go, i.e., it cannot identify a principled line
demarcating federal from state powers. Its memory concerning
federalism has also faded; while it remembers that the Framers wanted
federalism to be protected, it has forgotten that they believed that only
constitutional structure, and not an activist Court, can protect it. Its
interventions, inconsistent with the original design, have been
unprincipled and unsuccessful and have served "neither the purposes of
federalism nor the ideals of democracy." 34  The Court should
acknowledge that fact and allow the original federal design to rest in
peace-the victim of the "silent artillery of time."3
384. Bybee, supra note 2, at 567.
385. Lincoln, supra note 381, at 20.
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